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from : Presidency

to : Police Cooperation Working Party

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Subject : Handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension

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1. As agreed at the PCWP meeting of 14 February 2007, the Presidency, assisted by a limited number of experts, has updated and adapted the handbook for police and security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international dimension.
2. The handbook contained in the annex to this note is an "integrated" (covering both the public order and counter-terrorism aspect) handbook for different authorities. It is based on the *Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council* (12637/3/02 REV 3 ENFOPOL 123) and the *Handbook for the cooperation between MS to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events* (5744/1/04 REV 1 ENFOPOL 14). The content of these handbooks has been modified and updated where necessary to provide for a practical, user-friendly, easily readable and relevant manual.

3. It is proposed to submit this handbook to the Council explaining that it should replace the two previous handbooks and with a view to approving a recommendation about its use. It is also foreseen to publish this handbook, both in the Official Journal and on the Council website. Delegations are therefore invited to check that annex D only contains non-personal information.
  
4. **The PCWP is invited to examine and approve the handbook contained in annex and agree on the procedure as set out in point 3.**

**HANDBOOK FOR POLICE AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES CONCERNING  
COOPERATION AT MAJOR EVENTS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### I.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this handbook is to serve as a practical instrument providing guidelines and inspiration for law enforcement authorities in Europe undertaking the responsibility for security at major events with international dimension (such as Olympic Games or other major sporting events<sup>1</sup>, major social events or high level political meetings e.g. G8-summit). **Accordingly, the principles set out in this handbook should only be applied where appropriate and useful as well as in full compliance with national legislation.** They shall also not prejudice any arrangements set out in bilateral agreements or Memorandums of Understanding.

This handbook is a living document to be amended and adjusted in accordance with future experiences and development of best practices (see IV.2 Strategic Evaluation).

The *Security Handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council* (12637/3/02 REV 3 ENFOPOL 123) and the *Handbook for the cooperation between MS to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and comparable sporting events* (5744/1/04 REV 1 ENFOPOL 14) have been integrated into the current version of the handbook. Law enforcement authorities dealing with a major event with international dimension need to ensure the security of the event both from a public order point of view as well as counter-terrorism. Depending on the nature of the event (political, sporting, social, cultural or other) one aspect may be more relevant than the other and may be dealt with by other authorities but both need to be considered.

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<sup>1</sup> Recommendations for international police cooperation in connection with international football matches are set out in a separate handbook: Council resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322 of 29.12.2006, p. 1)

## **I.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES**

The enforcement of law and order should be guided by the principles of legality and proportionality and moderation preferring the less intrusive approach. Whenever possible, a de-escalating police approach should be chosen based on dialogue, negotiated management of public space and partnership.

Law enforcement authorities of the Member States responsible for security at major events with international dimension, in particular at political events, must seek to ensure that the human rights, in particular the right freely to express opinions and to assemble in a peaceful manner in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, are fully respected. Interference from elements whose objectives or actions are violent or other forms of criminal nature should be prevented to the furthest possible extent.

Although the host Member State is primarily responsible for providing security for the event, given its international character all other Member States and EU competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.

## **II. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

### **II.1 CONTACT POINTS**

#### **II.1.1 PERMANENT CONTACT POINTS**

According to Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1) at least one permanent contact point must be established by each Member State.

Contact details and other relevant information on the permanent contact point(s) should be provided to the General Secretariat of the Council (see annex D for GSC's information) for distribution to the Member States. Any relevant changes regarding the permanent contact point(s) of a Member State, should be reported in the same way (see annex D).

Every permanent contact point should be able to meet the following standards:

- 24-hour availability (to the necessary extent before, during and after an event),
- staff with sufficient language skills of at least one other EU language,
- permanently operational lines of communication and information structure including phone, fax and e-mail, where relevant secured via encryption, and access to the internet,
- sufficient translation capacities for the exchange of information.

## **II.1.2 EVENT-RELATED CONTACT POINTS**

For each major event with an international dimension, each Member State should designate one or more event-related contact points. Depending on national legislation or structures, this may be the same as the permanent contact point(s). Every event-related contact point should be able to meet the above-mentioned standards.

The organising Member State informs the permanent contact points of the other Member States (see Annex D) of the details of the event-related contact point(s). Each Member State then informs the organising Member State of his own contact point(s) related to that event.

The tasks of the event-related contact point(s) could include facilitating

- the collection and analysis of information nationally as well as from other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other sources of information,
- the quality control on form and content,
- the establishment of reliable and efficient lines of communication to relevant key players – nationally and internationally –secured lines preferred,
- the exchange of information through existing secure communication lines,
- the exchange of information in cooperation with other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other international institutions,
- the dissemination of processed information to their respective security services, police authorities and other services, such services of the organising state, as well as authorities and services in other Member States and relevant EU bodies, as appropriate,
- the provision of threat assessment and risk analysis on potential demonstrators and other groupings for the organising Member State,
- the observation, evaluation and follow-up on the event

## II.2 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

A Member State should without delay forward information, which its national authority considers to be relevant for the security of an event in another Member State, to its counterpart in this State. Member States when forwarding information should be conscious of their obligations in terms of its confidentiality.

The exchange of information should be carried out through existing communication channels and structures. The exchange of information, including personal data, should be conducted in strict compliance with the national and international law and treaties applicable in each case.<sup>2</sup>

It should be facilitated by the contact points of the involved Member States.

After being processed, the collected information should be distributed to relevant authorities and services. Contacts between security services, police authorities and services in different Member States may be coordinated and organised by their respective contact points.

The contact point(s) in the organising Member State should facilitate the collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information on the event with other Member States, third countries and relevant EU-bodies or other international institutions. The information could, inter alia, include

- information and intelligence obtained prior to the event that can potentially affect the course of the event or the maintenance of law and order and security in general,
- persons involved in terrorist organisations, terrorist actions or other major criminal activities, which might be indirectly related to terrorism;
- the level of threat against officials (heads of states and governments, members of Parliament, other VIPS etc.), athletes, visitors/spectators and venues. In addition to the host Member State, which has primary responsibility, all other Member States should independently contribute relevant information in respect to these persons;
- other information on targets and interests of EU Member States or of third countries in the organising country with a view to their better protection;
- information and intelligence related to potential demonstrators and other groupings;

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<sup>2</sup> Article 46 of the Schengen Convention (OJ L 239, 22.9.00, p. 19), Article 26 Prüm Treaty (16382/06 CRIMORG 194 ENFOPOL 216 MIGR 172).

- information obtained or requested during the event relating to persons suspected of having committed a criminal offence, including their name, date of birth, place of residence, background, circumstances of arrest and/or an exact description of the committed offence;
- information on applicable legislation and police policy on law-enforcement (to other Member States or third countries);
- incident and evaluation reports and contributions for these.

### **II.3 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK ANALYSIS**

An appropriate and timely assessment of the threats (related to terrorism, public order, organised crime and others) posed to the international event is of central importance in security terms. Alongside the specific assessment of the relevant threat, an analysis covering the collection, evaluation and dissemination of security-relevant information referring to a given specific situation should be made.

Apart from the intelligence available to the organising State itself, information and evaluations provided by other Member States will be the basis for the analysis. At the earliest possible stage prior to the international event, each contact point should provide to its counterpart in the organising State a permanent threat assessment, i.e. on individuals or groups expected to travel to the event and deemed to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order and/or security (such as known potential demonstrators and other groupings). The assessment should be forwarded to the organising Member State as well as other affected countries – i.e. transit or neighbouring countries. This analysis can be structured in accordance with the framework analysis in Annex B. If no such information is available, the organising State should be informed accordingly. The Member States should send it to the organising State as soon as possible by appropriate means using existing secure communication lines.

Europol can, in accordance with the mandate of Europol and the Europol Convention, provide relevant information and analysis as well as draw up general threat assessments on the basis of contributions by Member States. This information should be available at the earliest possible stage. If no such information is available, the organising State may be informed accordingly.

The selection of suitable, necessary and appropriate security measures should be based on the threat assessment covering the probability of a potential harm and on risk analysis.



For this reason, the responsible organising State, supported where appropriate by other Member States and EU competent bodies, should draw up an updated threat assessment and risk analysis six months before the relevant event at the latest. As the event approaches, the information should be updated on a regular basis. A monthly analysis should be forwarded in each of the last 3 months before the event and, if necessary, on a weekly basis before the event. Such assessments and analyses should be shared among contributing States and bodies.

During the event daily situation reports should be issued. The reports should be based on information provided by the host State, other Member States and EU competent bodies. The information should be as comprehensive as the available information allows.

### **III. EVENT MANAGEMENT**

#### **III.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVOLVED AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES IN THE ORGANISING STATE**

The competent authority of the organising Member State should draft an overall operational plan on the basis of which all further detailed plans are made. It also should establish a set of plans covering the policy level (*strategic*) as well as the overall operational level (*operational*) and the actual level of deployment on the ground (*tactical*). The planning procedure should commence at the earliest possible stage.

Prior to an event, the organising Member State should ensure that the roles of all involved authorities and services are clearly defined and that their respective responsibilities are communicated to all relevant parties.

The organising Member State could produce an overall matrix to reflect all involved processes and key players, (i.e. organisation of the meeting, security provision, maintenance of law and order, judicial services, social and preventive services, health services, public transportation and other infra-structural matters). This "blueprint" could be a useful tool to visualise the planning framework as well as ensure that all necessary processes are covered.

A coordinating project group for the event could be set up comprising representatives of all authorities and services involved. The group should meet regularly prior to, during and after the actual event, in order to ensure that decisions are made in a coherent and co-ordinated way. A prime responsibility of the group should be to ensure efficient lines of communication between all authorities and services.

The responsible authorities and services should ensure the presence of material, technical and personnel resources that are required to perform the assigned duties with the necessary efficiency, quality and swiftness. A database on all available resources and corresponding contact points would be a very useful tool for the organising Member States.

The police authorities of the organising Member States should ensure that all necessary agreements and arrangements regarding policing efforts are made with the practical organiser of the event. The organiser has the primary responsibility for the event and according to the event a list of requirements to be met should be established. The arrangements could, *inter alia*, include:

- locations of the event where no public disturbances should occur (meeting facilities, hotels),
- entrance control, perhaps perimeter security and the responsibility of each of these,
- security measures to be undertaken by the organiser, i.e. internal video surveillance,
- complete and constantly updated exchange of information on delegates and other participants in the event (name, function, length of stay, accommodation, transport etc.),
- arrangements with regards to VIP's and hotel security.

## **III.2 MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY**

### **III.2.1 PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY**

Adhering to the basic principles stated under section I.2, the competent authorities of the organising Member State should establish a clear overall policy for the police approach at international events. This overall policy could include policies such as:

- the police actions are characterised by guaranteeing the protection of peaceful demonstrations,

- the police should, through dialogue and a credible stage of preparedness, maintain the initiative thereby limiting or preventing riots or larger disturbances,
- the police should, at its discretion and when appropriate, demonstrate a low level of police visibility and a high level of tolerance regarding peaceful gathering and demonstrations,
- arrests should be made with the purpose of criminal prosecution or temporary detention etc. in accordance with national legislation,
- the police efforts should, in general, be concentrated on groupings that are planning or demonstrate the will to instigate disturbances,
- cooperation with other Member States, third countries, EU-bodies and international institutions should be promoted on relevant areas such as borders.

The organising Member State of more than one event on its territory should ensure that the police policy on law-enforcement is, to the furthest possible extent, harmonised for the different events. If it is appropriate the policy may also be coordinated with other Member States.

The competent authorities in the organising Member State should at an early stage initiate a dialogue with individuals and groups (including activist groups and demonstrators), local authorities, relevant infrastructural services, the local population and other key players in order to ensure that gatherings and legitimate demonstrations are carried out in a peaceful manner. The dialogue should be based on shared responsibility. It should commence at an early preparatory stage and be utilised as a tool before, during and after an event.

The establishment of a constructive and mutually respectful network will serve to prevent potential disturbances as well as serve as an instrument for mediation in a confrontational situation.

Dialogue structures or teams should be established at the national level and take into account the different cultures in the different Member States in the preparation and implementation of their task<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Doc. 14917/01 JAI 161, elements listed on page 3.

Channels of communication between the competent authorities and the various organisations, civil associations and representatives of demonstrators should be set up. The organisers of demonstrations and all relevant parties may be advised on

- practical matters – i.e. accommodation and logistics,
- relevant applicable legislation regarding demonstration, freedom of speech, civil disobedience etc.,
- police policy on law enforcement in matters where discretion can be exercised and instructions on the use of force of the police,
- contact points within the police and other relevant authorities.

Distribution of the above information in different languages is a measure to be considered (e.g. through folders, websites). The information may be supplied to foreign visitors through the respective contact points.

### **III.2.2 COMBAT OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES**

The Member States law enforcement agencies should - in accordance with the applicable legislation and the stated policies - aim for a consequent criminal investigative process towards offences committed in connection with violent demonstrations or other disturbances during the major event.

All defined and sustainable criminal offences should, in principle and in full accordance with national law, lead to criminal prosecution in the organising country or by competent legal authorities in another country. If an immediate law enforcement action in the organising Member State is not possible, the other Member States should make every effort to identify and prosecute their own nationals in accordance with national legislation, the present evidence and the circumstances of each case.

The organising Member State should make arrangements to ensure that sufficient resources are available for the arrest and investigation of criminal offences and that sufficient facility is available for custody and pre-trial detention. It is recommendable to plan for a worst-case scenario with larger quantities of perpetrators.

Accordingly, the law enforcement authorities should be geared to tackle a larger quantity of work and have the appropriate capacity to

- make speedy decisions on the use of pre-trial detention,
- make speedy decisions on investigation measures requiring a decision from a court of law,
- try a larger number of criminal cases,
- respond to legal requests from other States.

### **III.2.3 TERRORIST THREATS**

Due to the fact that the European Union and some of its Member States are important players in international politics, the European Union and its Member States are likely to be targets of politically or religiously motivated international terrorists. Apart from international terrorists attacking the European Union or its Member States at major events there is a possibility of attacks by terrorist groups or organisations located within the European Union or its Member States.

Aims of such terrorist attacks could be the event itself, VIPs, politicians of the European Union, national delegations of Member States or the public taking part in the event. The presence of the international media is an important point of view from the perpetrators' perspective, since this offers a platform for the presentation of the group's or organisation's ideology.

For the prevention of terrorist attacks information and intelligence about terrorist groups and organisations is essential and should be on hand at any time. Therefore it is important for the organising Member State and his law enforcement agencies to share information and intelligence in general and according to the event. The law enforcement agencies should decide which terrorist groups and organisations - and single persons - could be relevant, and check their own data base according to the event. In addition, all other Member States should independently contribute relevant information in respect to these persons, groups and organisations.

The selection of suitable, necessary and appropriate security measures should be based on threat assessment and risk analysis.

### **III.3 OPERATIONAL COOPERATION WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES**

#### **III.3.1 CROSS BORDER COOPERATION**

Cross border cooperation will be necessary when the organising Member State and involved countries implement a flexible, joint border regime to intensify the police efforts in the border regions adapted to the concrete situation or threat. If appropriate, common or co-ordinated preventive patrols and controls should be carried out.

For Member States applying the relevant parts of the Schengen Acquis, Articles 23-31 of the Schengen Border Code<sup>4</sup> (concerning the reinstatement of border controls at the internal borders) can be a useful instrument to prevent individuals or groups from travelling to the location of the event who are considered to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order and/or security.

The necessary arrangements for a quick and efficient implementation of the potential expulsion measures should therefore be prepared.

#### **III.3.2 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

The organising Member State may, in accordance with national legislation<sup>5</sup>, request the deployment of police or intelligence officers for operational support from another Member State for a specific event. A detailed request for operational support, including an account of the reasons for the request, should be made at the earliest possible stage. To this end a standard form is annexed to this document (Annex A).

Depending on the type of requested support, the appointed officer(s) should have the necessary knowledge and experience relevant to the designated tasks.

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<sup>4</sup> OJ L 105 of 13.4.2006, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Including Article 26 of the Prüm Treaty (16382/06 CRIMORG 194 ENFOPOL 216 MIGR 172).

Any operational support provided by foreign officers should be included in the operational plans of the competent authorities of the organising State. Accordingly, foreign officers should

- be included to the furthest possible extent in the operational information structure,
- be briefed on the operational plans and relevant policies including instructions on the use of force etc. in one of their working languages,
- be offered the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the venue and deployed police forces etc. prior to the event,
- attend all relevant briefing sessions (i.e. relevant to their task and if it is in a language they understand),
- where appropriate, be actively included in the police deployment on the ground.

The organising competent authorities are responsible for the physical security of the foreign officers. It is the responsibility of the foreign officers to ensure that their actions are not causing unnecessary conflict, danger or unjustified risks.

When deployed on the ground, foreign officers should at all times refer to and - as a rule - be under the supervision of members of the host competent authorities that are properly briefed on the operational plan and able to communicate in a language that the foreign officer understands. The communication lines between foreign officers, the host contact(s), the management of the deployed police forces and other key players should be efficient and fully functional during an event and, to the necessary extent, also before and after the event.

### **III.3.3 LIAISON OFFICERS<sup>6</sup>**

At the request of the organising Member State, each Member State or EU/other competent organisation may appoint liaison officers for an event, when relevant. A request for liaison officers should be made at the earliest possible stage and no later than 6 weeks prior to the event. To this end, a standard form is annexed to this document (Annex A).

Interested Member States may request an invitation to send a liaison officer to the organising Member State.

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<sup>6</sup> Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82, paragraph II, point 1(c)).

Liaison officers may be exchanged in accordance with bilateral arrangements between the organising Member State and other Member States involved.

The liaison officer should be appointed no later than 2 weeks before an event at which point the cooperation should commence. The organising State should, in close collaboration with the other Member States, decide upon the appointment and tasks of the liaison officers through their respective contact points.

The liaison officer, according to his/her skills, can be assigned to (any of) the host contact point(s) to be in charge of communication with the home State in which case the appropriate means of communication should be provided by the organising Member State.

Liaison officers should play an advisory and assistance role. The foreign liaison officers should be unarmed and have no official police authority in the host country<sup>7</sup>. Depending on their specific task, liaison officers should have appropriate experience in the maintenance of law and order or the field of counter-terrorism and, in particular, with

- a thorough knowledge of their national organisation and authorities,
- experience in maintaining public law and order at high profile events,
- access to all useful information sources in their home State, including on extremism and other relevant groupings from police as well as other relevant sources,
- the ability to organise intelligence efforts nationally prior to and during the event and analyse relevant information,
- good knowledge of the working language(s) chosen by the organising Member State.

Liaison officers should immediately upon their arrival report to their assigned contact point in order to clarify their designated tasks and mandate. The organising Member State will organise this accreditation process.

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<sup>7</sup> Joint Action 97/339/JHA, Article 2 (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1).



### **III.3.4 OBSERVERS**

Member States may, with the consent of the organising Member State, send observers to gather experience in security and the maintenance of law and order at international events for future events in their home countries. If so requested, the observer may provide an input for the evaluation undertaken by the organising Member State.

Observers should, to the furthest possible extent, be permitted to attend planning sessions, briefings, coordination meetings, operational deployments and other activities in order to maximise the benefit of the visit. Observers should immediately upon their arrival report to the assigned contact point. The organising Member State will organise the accreditation process.

### **III.3.5 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND EQUIPMENT**

The organising Member State should usually cover accommodation and subsistence costs of invited foreign officers travelling to its territory. Travelling costs are usually covered by the home country.

All costs related to observers sent to the organising Member State should be borne by the sending State. The organising Member State could – if possible - provide the necessary means of communication and other facilities for the observers.

The organising Member State may arrange for support from other Member States when possible through bilateral/multilateral agreements on temporary provision of equipment or other resources.

### **III.3.6 COMMUNICATION PLAN**

An adequate flow of information between police authorities and other services should be secured through a detailed communication plan. All involved parties within the organising Member State should develop a joint communication strategy to avoid overlaps or the dissemination of incomplete information.

In order to avoid gaps of knowledge (e.g. language) there should be the integration of liaison officers or other personnel within the communication plan.

Also other forces (e.g. fire brigade, rescue services) should be integrated into the communication plan.

#### **III.4 MEDIA STRATEGY**

In order to ensure an accurate and timely media coverage of international events, a pre-defined strategy for relations with the media should be in place before, during and after an event.

The media should be given the fullest possible degree of freedom to cover the event, thus safeguarding the right to freely express opinions in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The media strategy should be geared towards openness and transparency.

It is recommended that a single point of contact is appointed for the media to ensure a coordinated media coverage. Well in advance of the event, the organising Member State should establish an overall media strategy regulating, including inter alia

- designation of a point of contact for the media which will direct the media to the relevant spokespersons,
- area of competence for each spokesperson,
- the information to be given to the public on police measures and the steps which will be taken in case of disturbances.

#### **III.5 INSTRUCTION, TRAINING AND EXERCISE**

The development of the European ITE (instruction, training and exercise) programme is based on international strategic agreements and jointly-developed procedures and working methods. By participating in ITE activities, officials, teams, organisations and countries can prepare for events such as those described in this handbook.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The responsibility for ITE activities at major events rests with the Member State in which the event takes place. This means that Member States are themselves responsible for ensuring that ITE activities are managed effectively, and this handbook therefore contains no further assistance or instructions in this regard.

Large events as defined in this handbook involve international and cross-border elements and require:

- a. an information exchange between the Member States regarding the event: information management;
- b. knowledge of the police organisation in the organising Member State;
- c. acquisition of experience of large events and exchanges of information thus gained: seminars on lessons learned and case studies.

The above elements can then be used as input allowing this handbook to be continually updated and improved.

CEPOL has a role to play in the development, design and practice of ITE. Where possible, ITE activities should be integrated into existing CEPOL processes and products.

## **IV. EVALUATION**

### **IV.1 EVENT-RELATED EVALUATION**

The organising Member State should initiate an evaluation of security activities during the event and other relevant factors. All key personnel should be invited to contribute to the evaluation, which should be based on the prior planning of the event. In the evaluation process, the organising Member State may make use of evaluations from other Member States, but this should be agreed in advance.

The organising State should assemble an evaluation report as soon as possible once the event has ended. Where incidents of any kind have arisen, the evaluation report should also include an incident report.

Following the event, a debriefing should be held and a general evaluation report regarding relevant security aspects drawn up. The report should make special reference to public order disturbances (or absence thereof), terrorist threats and incidents, criminal offences, groups involved and lessons learned.

The report and/or lessons learned should form the basis for the ITE process (see III.5). CEPOL should ensure the implementation of international lessons learned in the ITE programme. The individual Member States are responsible for their implementation at national level. The report will be distributed by CEPOL to national police academies.

The report should be distributed through the event-related contact point(s) to the relevant EU bodies and other involved or otherwise interested countries or bodies in order to ensure that lessons learned or recommendations are made available for future organisers of a major event with an international dimension.

## **IV.2 STRATEGIC EVALUATION**

In order to share experiences and best practices an expert meeting should be held whenever needed, to be organized by the competent Council working party.

The participants should be senior police officers with experience in maintaining public law and order at major events with an international dimension. One of the topics of this expert meeting should be the further development and adjustment of this handbook regarding experiences from recent events.

**STANDARD FORM FOR THE REQUEST FOR LIAISON OFFICERS OR OFFICERS TO  
PROVIDE OTHER TYPES OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

1. Type of support requested (liaison officer, spotter, mediator or other)
2. Event(s)
3. Period
4. Place of station
5. Description of tasks (as detailed as possible)
6. Language skills (working languages of the event)
7. Other specific skills (knowledge of particular groups, mediation experience etc.)
8. Tasks to prepare ahead of arrival
  - communication with the home State
  - gathering of specific types of information
  - other tasks
9. Means of communication (mobile, internet)
10. Other types of required equipment
11. Please provide a reply by:

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**RISK ANALYSIS ON POTENTIAL DEMONSTRATORS AND OTHER GROUPINGS**

1. Name of group known and likely to demonstrate or in other ways affect the event
2. Composition, number of members
3. Distinguishing marks (clothes, logos, flags, slogans or other external characteristics)
4. Nature of the group (violent – risk of disturbances?)
5. Demonstration methods and/or activist methods
6. Internal organisation and functioning of the group
  - leadership
  - communication means
  - other structural information
7. Links to other groups (national or international)
8. Members previously involved in relevant incidents
  - type of incident
  - place (country)
  - individually or in a group
  - convictions with reference to the above, in accordance with national law
9. Behaviour
  - towards police services and actions
  - towards the local population
  - use of weapons
  - alcohol or drug consumption
  - wearing masks
  - pattern of behaviour at different types of events

10. Links and attitude towards the media (media strategy, spokesperson etc.)
  11. Internet websites and bulletin boards etc.
  12. Choice of travel route
  13. Means of transport
  14. Choice of accommodation
  15. Length of stay
  16. Information supplied by liaison officers in third countries on possible demonstrators or activists from these countries.
  17. Other relevant information
  1. Sources of the information and analysis of the accuracy and reliability of the provided information
-

**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING INDIVIDUALS  
POSING A TERRORIST THREAT<sup>9</sup>**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

<b>Personal details of the subject</b>	Name	
	Surname	
	Date of birth	
	Nationality	
	Passport 's Number	
	Criminal Record	
	Violent acts	
	Transport used	
	Name of the Organisation/ Support Network	
	Physical Features: * Height * Build * Colour of eyes * Scars	
	Observations	
	Others	

**PHOTO**  
**Fingerprint**

\_\_\_\_\_

<sup>9</sup> Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and should never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country. A relevant handling code should be used.



**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING GROUPS**  
**POSING A TERRORIST THREAT<sup>10</sup>**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

<b>Details of the Group</b>	Name of Group	
	Origin and aim of Group	
	Brief note on previous activities	
	Modus operandi	
	Observations	

<sup>10</sup> Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and should never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country. A relevant handling code should be used.

## REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

- Joint Action 97/339/JHA of 26 May 1997 regarding cooperation on public law and order and security (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1)
- Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (OJ C 340, 10.11.1997, p.93)
- Treaty of Nice, Declaration on the venue of European Councils (OJ C 80 of 10.3.2001, p. 85)
- Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations (OJ L 101, 11.4.2001, p.1)
- Council resolution concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (OJ C 322 of 29.12.2006, p. 1)
- Prüm Treaty (document 16382/06 CRIMORG 194 ENFOPOL 216 MIGR 172)
- Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg concerning cross-border police intervention of 8 June 2004
- Conflict management manual of guidance (7047/01 ENFOPOL 21 + COR 1(en, el))
- Conclusions of the JHA Council of 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and similar events (10916/01 JAI 82)
- Checklist regarding possible measures on the occasion of European Councils and other comparable events (11572/01 ENFOPOL 90)
- Strategic information concerning European Councils and other comparable events – Risk analysis (11694/01 ENFOPOL 92)
- Conclusions of the sub-workgroup EUCPN JAI 82 (14917/01 JAI 161)
- Security at meetings of the European Council and other comparable events – International cooperation at the Laeken European Council (9029/02 ENFOPOL 65)
- Security handbook for European Councils and other similar events (9069/02 ENFOPOL 66)
- Security at meetings of the European Council (11836/02 ENFOPOL 116)
- The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (14469/3/05 JAI 423 ECOFIN 353 TRANS 234 RELEX 639 ECO 136 PESC 1010 COTER 72 COSDP 810 PROCIV 174 ENER 172 ATO 103)
- Europol Support to Member States - Major International Sporting Events (File no: 2570-50r1)

**PERMANENT CONTACT POINTS CONCERNING PUBLIC ORDER** (Article 3(b) of Joint Action 97/339/JHA (OJ L 147, 5.6.1997, p. 1))

Updates should be sent to [pcwp@consilium.europa.eu](mailto:pcwp@consilium.europa.eu)

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BE	Federal Police PCN/DAO	Fritz Toussaint 47, 1050 Brussels	32 2 642 6380	32 2 646 4940	dga-dao@skynet.be
	Ministry of the Interior, Crisis Centre	Hertogstraat 53, 1000 Brussels	32 2 506 4711	32 2 506 4709	
CZ	Police Presidium of the Czech Republic International Police Co-operation Division	Strojnická 27 P.O. Box 62/MPS Prague 7	420 974 834 210	420 974 834 716	sirene@mvr.cz
DK	National Commissioner of the Danish Police, Sirene	Politortvet 14 1780 Copenhagen V	45.33.148.888	45.33.322.771	
DE	Bundeskriminalamt, ZD 11-KDD	Thaerstr. 11 65193 Wiesbaden	49.611.55.13101	49.611.55.12141	zd11@bka.bund.de
	Bundesministerium des Innern	Stabsstelle Krisenmanagement Lagezentrum, Alt-Moabit 101 D, 10559 Berlin	49.30.18681.1077	49.30.18681.2926	poststelle@bmi.bund.de
EE	Central Law Enforcement Police	Ädala 4E, Tallinn, 10614	372 612 3900	372 612 3990	<a href="mailto:julgestuspolitsei@jp.pol.ee">julgestuspolitsei@jp.pol.ee</a>
EL	Min. of Public Order, YDT/3e	Kanellopoulou 4 10177 Athens	301.692.5030	301.692.2466	
ES	Dirección general de la policía, Comisaría general de seguridad ciudadana, Centro nac. de coordinación	C/Francos Rodríguez 104 28039 Madrid	34.91.3227190	34.91.3227188	<a href="mailto:cgsc.cgeneral@policia.es">cgsc.cgeneral@policia.es</a>
FR	Min de l'Intérieur, Dir. Générale de la Police Nationale, Cabinet « Ordre Public »	11 rue des Saussaies 75008 Paris	33.1.40.07.22.84	33.1.40.07.64.99	
IE	Office of Liaison and Protection Section, An Garda Síochana	Dublin 8	353.1.666.2842	353.1.666.2843	

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<b>IT</b>	Ministero dell'Interno, Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza, Ufficio Ordine Pubblico	Piazza del Viminale 1 00184 Rome	39.06.-46521309 or 21315	39.06.465.36117	cnims@interno.it
<b>CY</b>	Ministry of Justice and Public Order, Police Headquarters, European Union and International Police Cooperation Directorate, Police Cooperation Office	Nicosia, 1478, Cyprus	357 2280 8573	357 2280 8605	cyipcc@cytanet.com.cy.
<b>LV</b>	Operative Control Bureau of Public Security Department Central Public Order Police Department State Police	Brivibas str 61, 1010 Riga	371 707 5430 371 707 5310	371 727 6380	armand.virsis@vp.gov.lv vpdd@vp.gov.lv
<b>LT</b>	Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau International Liaison Office	Liepyno 708105, Vilnius	370 5 271 9900	+370 5 271 9924	office@ilnb.lt
<b>LU</b>	Direction Générale de la Police G-D, Direction des Opérations, Centre d'Intervention National	2957 Luxembourg	352.4997.2346	352.4997.2398	<a href="mailto:cin@police.etat.lu">cin@police.etat.lu</a>
<b>HU</b>	International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre National Police	Teve utca 4-6, 1139 Budapest	36 1 443 5557	36 1 443 5815	intercom@orfk.police.hu
<b>MT</b>	Malta Police Force Police General Headquarters	Floriana	356 21 224 001 356 21 252 111	356 21 235 467 356 21 247 794	
<b>NL</b>	Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Crisis Centre	PO Box 20011 2500 EA The Hague	31 70 426 5000 31 70 426 5151	31 70 361 4464	ncc@crisis.minbzk.nl (24h, NL/EN)
<b>AT</b>	Federal Ministry of the Interior Directorate General for Public Safety Operations and Crisis Coordination Centre	Minoritenplatz 9, 1014 Wien	43 1 531 263 200 43 1 531 263 770 (24h)	43 1 531 263 120 (24h) 43 1 531 261 08612 (e-fax, 24h)	<a href="mailto:ekc@bmi.gv.at">ekc@bmi.gv.at</a> (24h)

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	<b><u>contact point concerning counter-terrorism</u></b> Division on Combating Terrorist Acts Central Bureau of Investigation General Headquarters of Police tefephone:		48 22 60 13 275	48 22 60 14 293	counterterror@policja.gov.pl
PT	Sirene, Lote 175 Flamengo	S. Antonio dos Cavaleiros 2670 Loures	351.21.989.8800	351.21.989.0825	
	Min. Admin. Interna, Gabinete Coord. Seg.	Praça do Comercio 1194-015 Lisboa	351.09178.15098		<a href="mailto:gsc@sg.mai.gov.pt">gsc@sg.mai.gov.pt</a>
SI	International Police Cooperation Sector in Criminal Police Directorate	Štefanova 2 1000 Ljubljana	386 1 472 4780	386 1 2517 516	interpol.ljubljana@policija.si
SK					
FI	National Bureau of Investigation, Sirene	POB 285 01301 Vantaa	3589.8388.6910	358.9.8388.6911	krp-sirene@krp.poliisi.fi
SE	NCID, ILO	POB 12256 10226 Stockholm	468.401.3700	468.651.4203	<a href="mailto:nsk@rkp.police.se">nsk@rkp.police.se</a>
UK					