

**Towards a Grand Strategy
for an Uncertain World**

Renewing Transatlantic Partnership

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Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World

Renewing Transatlantic Partnership

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Executive summary

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In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. But in a world of asymmetric threats and global challenges, our governments and peoples are uncertain about what the threats are and how they should face the complicated world before them.



After explaining the complexity of the threats, the authors assess current capabilities and analyse the deficiencies in existing institutions, concluding that no nation and no institution is capable of dealing with current and future problems on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities.

Based on this, the authors propose a new grand strategy, which could be adopted by both organisations and nations, and then look for the options of how to implement such a strategy. They then conclude, given the challenges the world faces, that this is not the time to start from scratch. Thus, existing institutions, rather than new ones, are our best hope for dealing with current threats. The authors further con-

clude that, of the present institutions, NATO is the most appropriate to serve as a core element of a future security architecture, providing it fully transforms and adapts to meet the present challenges. NATO needs more non-military capabilities, and this underpins the need for better cooperation with the European Union.

Following that approach, the authors propose a short-, a medium- and a long-term agenda for change. For the short term, they focus on the critical situation for NATO in Afghanistan, where NATO is at a juncture and runs the risk of failure. For this reason, they propose a series of steps that should be taken in order to achieve success. These include improved cost-sharing and transfer of operational command. Most importantly, the authors stress that, for NATO nations to succeed, they must resource operations properly, share the risks and possess the political will to sustain operations.

As a medium-term agenda the authors propose the development of a new strategic concept for NATO. They offer ideas on how to solve the problem of the rivalry with the EU, and how to give NATO access to other than military instruments. They further propose bringing future enlargement and partnership into line with NATO's strategic objectives and purpose.

In their long-term agenda the authors propose abandonment of the two-pillar concept of America and Europe cooperating, and they suggest aiming for the long-term vision of an alli-

ance of democracies ranging from Finland to Alaska. To begin the process, they propose the establishment of a directorate consisting of the USA, the EU and NATO. Such a directorate should coordinate all cooperation in the common transatlantic sphere of interest.

The authors believe that the proposed agenda could be a first step towards a renewal of the transatlantic partnership, eventually leading to an alliance of democratic nations and an increase in certainty.



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Preface

In every country, and at all times, we like to rely on certainty. Certainty about the past, the present and even the future. Yet certainty is based not on inevitability, but rather on social and intellectual needs. We seek to uphold a common and stable experience, shunning the arbitrary in favour of closure in debate. Certainty can promote strong society and social interdependence.

While 100 per cent certainty may be unattainable, it is clear that in periods of great – even overwhelming – uncertainty something serious is happening to our institutions and our societies.

Certainty in our world is today being eroded by a proliferation of information, knowledge and choice. The erosion of certainty is accelerated by rapid technological, social and cultural change. On occasion, that change occurs too fast for some of our major institutions to cope with.

In certain important senses, we are today operating in a mist. Through that current mist a wide range of challenges are appearing. The challenges are acute, and no less so because our certainties are in retreat. If they were stronger, our resolve to address these problems might have stiffened. But



the loss of familiar certainties reveals that we lack such resolve.

There are six principal challenges that the authors of this report identify as the prime challenges facing the global community today.

- The first is demography. Population growth and change across the globe will swiftly change the world we knew. The challenge this poses for welfare, good governance and energy security (among other things) is vast.
- Then there is climate change. This greatly threatens physical certainty, and is leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future.
- Energy security continues to absorb us. The supply and demand of individual nations and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution make the situation more precarious than ever.
- There is also the more philosophic problem of the rise of the irrational – the discounting of the rational. Though seemingly abstract, this problem is demonstrated in deeply practical ways. There are soft examples, such as the cult of celebrity, which demonstrate the decline of reason. And then there are the harder examples, such as the decline of respect for logical argument and evidence, a drift away from science in a civilisation that is deeply technological. The ultimate example is the rise of religious

fundamentalism, which, as political fanaticism, presents itself as the only source of certainty.

- Another challenge is the weakening of the nation state. This coincides with the weakening of world institutions, including the United Nations and regional organisations such as the European Union, NATO and others.
- Finally, there is what one might refer to as – despite all its benefits – the *dark side* of globalisation. Interconnectedness has its drawbacks. These include internationalised terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. Migration continues to provide challenges across the world. And dramatic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS have the potential to spread around the world faster than ever before. Taken together, globalised threats are wide in scale and unprecedented in complexity.

But identifying these problems is only the start. We must attempt to understand what might be next.

In considering issues likely to arise, we are mocked by predictions from the past that have failed to come true. But in themselves, these can offer a lesson. One widely made prediction, which can now be dismissed, was the issue of loss of identity through convergence. Against the backdrop of the troubles in the Middle East, and also

the micro-national squabbles in the West, we can see that globalisation has not entirely eroded national identities. This re-emergence of identity politics might be held up as a warning to all potential seers.

Though there will be issues that stable states and properly functioning international organisations might be able to deal with, deeply challenging problems like those in the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, where Western credibility is at stake, may tempt us into either intervention or isolation. Either way, these problems will confront us. Isolationism is back as a political problem. Its previous expressions may appeal, even as the desire to intervene appeals.

State failures, if they are allowed to happen, could yet combine with other factors such as urbanisation and the rise of fundamentalisms to usher in a new, illiberal age. That age would be not just uncertain but deeply perilous. It is a future that we must avoid; but in order to avoid it, we must first admit the uncomfortable fact that it is possible.

The present authors approach the challenges of today from a Western perspective. We also do so as military men – though military men who have worked happily across national lines over many years. It is a pleasure to be able to demonstrate that we can still do so.

In writing this paper, we do not aim, and would not presume, to offer a prescription for today's

world. Rather, we simply hope to share some thoughts on today's world that have been gathered from experience – experience acquired over many years, marked by great movements of history, which happily never brought the ultimate challenge. We recognise this with deep gratitude – not least gratitude for the resolve of our joint nations and their prevailing will to stand together during the Cold War. If it is not presumptuous to do so, we hope that in this paper we offer something that might be helpful to those who now carry a heavy responsibility in demanding times, and hope, in gratitude, that we can pay a little back.

Introduction

Certainty is a rare luxury. In trying to understand the trends behind rapid change, we often struggle to understand specific dangers and challenges. Demographic change, climate change, economic growth and the rising demand for resources have all led to increased competition between global players.



Though the threat of terrorist violence now exists everywhere, the immediate threat of terrorism is not the only danger. More subtle techniques abound: states can deploy their capabilities anonymously, through proxy wars or cyber attacks; leverage in energy and financial resources can be used by states that wish to deter others using non-military means. Set against a background of global trends that point towards increasing instability, the conflicts of the 21st century display unprecedented complexity.

One of the most important pillars of certainty in the Western world has been the transatlantic alliance; but this pillar has been weakened by a lack of consensus among its members, by outdated mechanisms and by a lack of will. This has diminished the alliance's credibility, leaving

its citizens vulnerable. In part, this is caused by the pace of globalisation, which has brought great benefits, but has also exposed societies to greater risk.

What are these changes brought about by globalisation? Globalisation of movement, trade, capital flows and information have brought tremendous economic, social, political, educational and health benefits. But as a by-product, dangers have also globalised, with a complexity beyond predictability. The question we have to ask is: how do we confront challenges in a world full of uncertainties – challenges that we may not be able to predict? What capabilities and strategies do we currently possess to address an increasingly uncertain world?

In this pamphlet, we seek to understand trends, challenges and specific threats in a global context. By examining the effectiveness of national and international institutions and their strategies, we will consider ways in which present organisations can be adapted and improved to meet new needs. We will offer some ideas about what kind of strategy will be required, and then suggest how such a strategy might be implemented. Before addressing the nature of the capabilities and strategies we have, it is essential to consider the consequences of globalisation.

The globalised exchange of information, movement and capital has led to many benefits, including a great increase in economic prosperity and positive political change, as well as many

social advances and improvements in health. The division of tasks and production processes, spread over many areas, generates enormous efficiency and economic growth. Other areas, concerning political, social and health issues, will likewise benefit from the global movement and exchange of capital and expertise.

This exchange of information greatly enhances the possibilities for education and human rights, not least the education and rights of women. This improves the standard of living of whole nations. Globalised cooperation in medicine contributes to disease prevention in large parts of the world – as demonstrated in forums like the Pacific Health Summit. Despite many risks, globalisation is one of the best instruments for improving the lives of people across the world, benefiting both the developed and the developing worlds. Even when economic discrepancies widen, and dramatic changes in the economy and social systems of the developed world occur, this should not obscure the considerable improvements in the quality of life.

At the same time, this globalised world has introduced a strategic environment that is unprecedented in its complexity. The threat of the Cold War, with a rational opponent, was mono-dimensional and largely dominated by military affairs. This made the strategic military threats and risks more predictable than they are today. Previous eras – such as the period during which the British Empire was at its height – also ‘globalised’ much of the world. But the novelty of

globalisation today is that it allows for local risks and threats to become global dangers. When specific threats and risks are further amplified by larger trends, it becomes necessary to appreciate connections between areas that are commonly assessed separately. We no longer have the comparative luxury of considering threats only in their military dimension, since they cannot be understood in isolation from a wider context.

For the globalisation of information, the internet and the mobile phone are primary instruments. But because users determine what they view, these instruments more often 'narrowcast', rather than broadcast information, and the social and political consequences vary across different types of regime.

Within free societies, the openness of the internet gives citizens free access to materials of incitement, education in the preparation of explosives, and the ability to attain instant global recognition if they succeed in inflicting harm. On the other hand, the internet is censored in many non-democratic countries, restricting the free exchange of information and ideas. Such liberties are perceived to be a political threat, but the success of these regimes in censoring the internet will only be temporary. The impact of the globalisation of information will therefore likely contribute to the decline of authoritarianism and extremist ideology as political forces in the long term. In the short term, however, both cyberspace and mobile-space are

part of the problem, amplifying and globalising current political and security threats.

Mobile-space also has unprecedented security implications, in that a mobile phone can act as an instrument of political dissent in non-democratic countries. While in democratic countries, this same mobile-space can be used to undermine open societies. The large-scale demonstrations that accompanied the state of emergency in the Philippines in early 2006 were called by mass text-messaging. But the Paris riots of 2005 and the Danish Cartoon riots of 2005–06 were largely incited in the same way.

Enemies of democracies – including Islamist terrorists – greatly rely on the internet and mobile-space created in free societies, and they use them against those societies. The instruments of globalisation have given these non-state actors a global reach. The globalisation of the terrorist threat would not have been possible without the information revolution. The globalisation of trade has given organised crime and the illegal arms trade a similar reach, blurring the distinction between global criminality and terrorism. This should concern states that are a part of the globalising economy, as well as failing states that are not.

Although the globalising economy has led to general growth in the world, it has also widened economic discrepancies to some degree. In addition to this, the internet and mobile-space have drastically increased awareness of these differ-

ences in the developing world, and also in failing states. It may therefore be incentive, rather than any particular crisis, that causes migratory pressure, but the biggest global dangers can still emanate from failing states with acute crises.

State failure is a risk that, in its worst form (the failure of a nuclear armed state), could trigger a crisis on a global scale. The world has already experienced cases where failing states have been used as launching pads for global terrorism. Other sources of instability, such as acute hunger, violent persecution and civil war, trigger refugee flows, which in turn harm economies elsewhere.

Local matters have global repercussions, but the effect is reciprocal. The local can be affected by global trends first, and the reason for that may lie not in any failure to be part of the global economy, but rather in being an active participant in it.

India, despite significant domestic problems and the risk of armed conflict with Pakistan, represents an example of a success story of globalisation. With a large, educated and English-speaking population, it has become globally available for innumerable services. In European industry, a substantial part of software is written in India, representing a particular kind of dependency of which few Europeans are aware. Globalisation of services and manufacturing can make Western economies very vulnerable when stability cannot be taken for granted.

This Western vulnerability, born of a new dependency on Asian services and manufacturing, is as acute today as is the European dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Westerners are not unaccustomed to enduring a gradual appreciation in gasoline prices during Middle Eastern crises or wars, but they are completely unprepared for the more immediate and deep economic meltdown that would be caused by a major crisis affecting the Indian hi-tech industry – such as a war with Pakistan or large-scale civil unrest. The most positive uses of the global economy, in other words, make the world as a whole vulnerable to local crises.

In the background of these developments of human activity, both beneficial and dangerous, the larger trends of demographic and climate change that are in motion will lead to new, and newly challenging, types of global strain.

In Chapter 1, we will consider the major trends, challenges and specific threats that are operating in the world today. We believe that, unlike in previous eras, we can no longer afford to consider challenges separately. Appreciating and addressing the wider context of each question in the present situation is a new and challenging phenomenon, and no nation state will be able to face the current sum of risks and dangers on its own.

In a world that is linked by economics and communications, but also socially and politically, we can no longer consider military, economic, en-

vironmental and social affairs in isolation. For instance, climate change can affect trade, water and food supplies, migration, urbanisation and national security. Hostile actors operate in wider regional and global contexts. What we need in our analysis is an appreciation of a new kind of complexity – one where we may not always have predictability. To be prepared for what cannot be predicted is going to be one of the foremost challenges in the years ahead.

There are currently inadequate national and international capabilities to deal with these problems – and, more importantly, there is a lack of coordination among allies. There is, additionally, little public awareness, and thus little political will to address them. Such a lack of resolve is itself a vulnerability that increases risk. The main reason for this attitude, from both the general public and their political leaders, is a heavy focus on social and domestic matters, and an unwillingness to face up to complex realities.

Adequate institutional reform has only just begun in many Western countries, and it is still far from being accepted, let alone implemented. With the short attention span of the public, and the focus of politicians on little beyond the next election, it will be no small challenge to muster the necessary will to seriously tackle long-term challenges.

This lack of awareness and political will has had strange results, not least in the flight towards

the irrational, the condemnation of those who act, and praise of those who do nothing.

A hostile act need not be committed by a nation state, nor enacted by military means. In addition to the ongoing threats posed by international terrorism by non-state or proxy-state actors, acts of war can be committed by individual nation states or allied states by abusing the leverage that other resources bring. China and Russia today are economic powers that might be tempted to deter other nations with the weapons of finance and energy resources. This kind of deterrence by non-military means represents a new phenomenon and has never been a part of traditional military thinking. To appreciate such cases strategically will demand a much broader conception of strategy than we have hitherto employed, and any strategic responses will have to be consigned to more than military matters alone. But what are the strategies and capabilities that our institutions possess today to address the wide spectrum of present challenges?

In Chapter 2, we consider the international and national capabilities we currently possess to respond to trends and dangers. We identify several shortcomings of present instruments, institutions and their strategies. We will also underline the difficulties that arise in the attempt to produce a proper strategic concept and political–military mechanism. The interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan show that it is very difficult to come up with a good total concept, which contains a clear mis-

sion, a clear strategy, clear political guidance and a clear view of the command structures and a well-functioning political–military decision-making mechanism.

The intervention in Bosnia was flawed in many respects, because resolve was weak. The concept itself was flawed, with a combination of peace-keeping operations on the ground and fighting capabilities in the air – but we did not have the capabilities to match even this concept. It does not appear as though we learnt much from this experience in Kosovo. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq lack a comprehensive strategy, because there is insufficient clarity about the aims and direction of the missions.

Will it be possible for our institutions to formulate a strategic concept to deal with the set of challenges described in Chapter 1? A broad range of capabilities and a new flexibility will be required to respond to unpredictable crises. Our present capabilities fall short in many respects.

When all the major challenges are compared with the best and most far-reaching current capabilities, we conclude, with regret, that there is a considerable mismatch between requirements and actual capabilities. Given that no nation state can deal with current dangers on its own, and given the limitations of international organisations and alliances, what is needed is a new kind of integrated and allied grand strategy that can guide both policy and institutional reform. Alliances will be central to this grand

strategy. We do not propose creating new institutions, but instead using existing international institutions as building blocks to implement a new kind of grand strategy – one that is integrated across various policy domains and across allies. In Chapter 3, we will further elaborate the meaning of these two elements – the integrated and the allied.

In the fourth and final chapter of this document, we will discuss how such a new strategy may be implemented, both within nations and, especially, in international organisations, such as NATO and the EU. The focus here will be on the transatlantic alliance, of which NATO is still the best formal expression. For this reason, despite certain shortcomings, NATO will be the principal, though not exclusive, instrument by means of which this strategy can be implemented.

At the heart of a Western strategic renewal is a renewal of the transatlantic partnership. Through that alliance, we hope that, despite huge challenges, we may move closer to certainty.



Trends and Challenges

This chapter concerns the complexities and challenges that we currently face. We will consider several larger trends and challenges of global concern, and then turn to more specific regional considerations. Our aim is to highlight the complexity and interrelation between larger general trends and specific challenges and threats, and to recognise that in our age it is no longer possible to view any single problem in isolation from a wider relevant context.

Global Trends

Demographic Changes

By 2050, according to projections by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the world's population will have increased from the current 6.7 billion to exceed 9 billion.¹ The developed world is shrinking and ageing demographically, while parts of the developing world are growing. The world population is also urbanising, with the global threshold of 50 per cent urbanisation recently passed. By 2050, the global urban population could exceed 5 billion, which will have major social consequences, including urban

¹ All figures in this section are based on the medium-level projections by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, at <http://www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm>

poverty and crime rates, and will underlie severe environmental problems. The number of elderly (60+) in the world will, for the first time, exceed the number of children (14 and younger) by 2045 (though this happened in Europe in 1995). These demographic changes will affect all parts of the world in growing, ageing or shrinking populations. Whereas a number of regions will be ageing – Europe, Japan and China – only one region in the world will be both ageing and shrinking: Europe.

The population of Europe (including Russia) currently makes up around 11 per cent of the world's total, and the median age of Europeans is 38.9. It is estimated that this figure will be 47.3 by 2050, when Europe will account for 7 per cent of the world's population. The number of European elderly is expected to be more than double that of children by 2050, and to be significantly more than half the size of the working population. This will place a great burden on the welfare states of several European nations through the increased cost of the elderly – rising from around 15 per cent of GDP in 2000 to around 25–30 per cent in 2040. These figures suggest there is a danger that Europe may turn inwards, struggling economically to maintain its social systems and vulnerable on account of its weakened global position.

In the developed world, only the United States will retain the more healthy median age of 36 now and 41 by 2050; its population will grow from 300 million to 400 million in the same period.

Despite AIDS, genocide, starvation and war, the population of Africa will rise from over 920 million today to 1.3 billion by 2025. In 2050, Africa's population will be around 2 billion. Addressing HIV in sub-Saharan Africa is essential if the lives of Africans are to be improved – for social, educational

and security reasons (with high HIV infection rates in the armed forces of several African nations).

In the Middle East, the employable population will grow by 50 per cent in the same period, and it remains questionable whether African and some Middle Eastern economies can absorb such large population growth. Unemployment can lead to despair, radicalisation, and terrorism and armed conflict. Migration pressure to Europe is likely to increase.

In Russia, the population is shrinking on account of low birth rates, a high death rate and emigration. If its current population of 143 million drops to around 110 million by 2050, Russia will increasingly struggle to control its vast landmass. India's population will keep growing, and will exceed 1.6 billion in 2050; and, though its population will also age, it will retain a healthier median age of 38 by 2050. The demographic growth of China will remain largely managed by its one-child policy (1.3 billion now, 1.45 billion in 2025 and 1.4 billion in 2050). But the rapid growth of the Chinese minority in Russia, the presence of several million illegal Chinese in Siberia (not inhibited by China's one-child policy) and the imbalance in population density and economic prosperity across the Sino-Russian border all point to an increase in the Sinification of areas of Russia. These trends suggest that the centuries-long rivalry between Russia and China is unlikely to abate, although it would be unwise to rule out the potential risk of a 'Greater East' alliance against the West. In addition, China will have to cope with several consequences of its one-child policy – including ageing, urbanisation, crime and the social repercussions of gender imbalance caused by the selective abortion of girls – as well as with the economic gap between its 200 million citizens who are benefiting from the globalising economy and the billion that are not.

For these reasons, the Western world will face increasing pressure from all these demographic trends. As internal social balances weaken as a consequence of ageing, there is a great risk that the European continent especially will turn in on itself, while migratory pressure from without will affect national identities faster than populations can cope. These trends will affect the ability of European nations to act outside their own borders and will make them increasingly inward looking, which will reduce their commitment to take on global responsibilities.

Climate Change

Another major global trend – and one not easily controlled – is the global rise in temperature. Most debates are currently focused on the extent of human agency and on the nature of the causes of climate change. Should climate change have the effects popularly predicted – by no means a *fait accompli* – then geostrategy will return as an important factor in international politics. The strategic consequences of climate change include refugee problems, the commercial and military implications of new maritime lines of communication, and the danger that minor rivalries may develop into dangerous conflicts.

For example, ethnic tensions may be exacerbated if decreased rainfall leads to food shortages, or if diverse weather and geological developments lead to a rise in sea levels, flooding and desertification, which in turn lead to mass migration of ‘environmental refugees’. Nonetheless, the problems of ethnic strife, refugees and national security should not be blamed solely on the weather.

But there are some economic and geopolitical challenges that

are already apparent as a consequence of climate change, and these will require international responses. Minor tensions between Norway and Russia over fishing rights around Spitsbergen already exist. The islands of Spitsbergen, however, have large deposits of gas and oil that are currently locked under a frozen continental shelf. If global warming were to allow this to become a viable source of energy, a serious conflict could emerge between Russia and Norway, because the delineation of the continental shelf is still disputed. Such a potential crisis will involve a much larger area of the Arctic Circle, and will see the USA, Russia, Canada and Denmark competing for large and viable energy sources and precious raw materials.

There will also be other geopolitical consequences if climate change allows the northern shore of Russia, currently in a permafrost condition, to be open to shipping. Similarly, what does it mean for shipping and trade with Asia if climate change allows the northern shore of Canada to be open to shipping all year round? What future military and naval requirements will be needed to protect such new and highly lucrative lines of maritime communication? What will the impact be on American–Canadian relations?

Of all global trends, it is climate change that will put renewed emphasis on geostrategy in the strategic and security considerations of the future. Climate change and the wider problems of environmental pollution as a disutility of economic growth will also have an increasing impact on China and India, and may produce reasons for conflict.

Decline of Sovereignty

Borderless environmental and demographic trends, threats

from non-state actors and the globalisation of information and capital flow all have an impact on national sovereignty. Nonetheless, the one trend that has affected national sovereignty most is the drift towards regionalisation. The European Union is an interesting example of integration, but internally it is divided about the way ahead, not least because it seems to lack the resolve to protect the liberties it enjoys.

The most important accomplishment of the European Union is that it made war among its members impossible. Their interconnected economies have led to unprecedented prosperity for the EU's 495 million citizens and have created the most profitable consumer market in the world. Other regional organisations are studying the model of the EU, and may choose some elements – even if they are unlikely to adopt the same model, because no nation seeking to increase its economic power would be willing to see its national sovereignty diminished.

The regional integration of Europe has led to nations transferring some of their national sovereignty to the supranational organisation. This has been the source of some day-to-day stability, but the delegation of autonomy has made it difficult to summon political will on the regional level to respond effectively to crises.

The European religious wars were settled by the nation state and its corresponding definition of national sovereignty in the treaty of Westphalia (and Münster) of 1648. Since much of the suffering of the 20th century is perceived to have been rooted in nationalism, the post-1945 European integration moved Europe to a post-Westphalian order, where few citizens feel that they belong to the larger entity. There is no European army, and no one has ever fought or died for the European Union. If national identities are perceived to be threatened, or

too much national sovereignty is delegated, it is not inconceivable that there may be a renaissance of the nation state – or worse, a backlash of micro-nationalism – as currently witnessed among the Flemish, the Scots, the Basques and others.

If stronger regional organisations imply a diminished place for national sovereignty, it may seem contradictory to maintain that the strategic environment that lies before us requires both strong nation states and strong international organisations.

Few, if any, nations, however, will be able to face many of the global challenges on their own, and the need will remain for a credible and responsive international organisation. The European Union, with its lack of political unity and its insufficient capabilities, is unable to meet these challenges. No new or reformed international institution will be credible without a strong resolve at the national level to address these challenges with allies, rather than seeking short-term political gain. This requires vision, political courage and determination.

The EU's common purpose was principally economic and legal, but despite its economic strength, the EU is weak both as a political and as a military entity. People in the European Union take for granted personal, economic and social liberties, such as the freedom of movement. Attaining this level of individual liberty has been an incredible achievement. But very few EU citizens feel any responsibility to defend these liberties by military force, should the need arise. When citizens consider citizenship to be nothing more than a vehicle for the enjoyment of rights, with duties left to others, then the military is left on the fringes. This has consequences both for the quality of the armed forces and for the respect afforded to them.

NATO is a political and military alliance that has been a successful example of an international structure, able to demonstrate both national and institutional strength. Formed for the collective defence against a common enemy, NATO did not dissolve when the Warsaw Pact disappeared, although its political unity has begun to fade.

The vulnerability – particularly of European citizens – that arises from a weak EU, weak national resolve and a weakened NATO is enormous when a combination of hostile actors and larger impersonal trends converge against Europe.

In this, material elements such as wealth and military capabilities are, of course, just as important as such philosophical considerations as the meaning of identity, citizenship and core values. One part of a nation's identity is the manner in which it extends citizenship to newcomers. The US has generally been better than Europe in incorporating new citizens into American society. Both Europe and America share the same core values, and – as in other Westernised parts of the world – enjoy open societies that face very similar cultural challenges.

Loss of the Rational

The trend of regionalisation and its active pursuit – especially in the case of the European Union – has not merely led to a decline of the nation state. It has, at times, led to a weakening of national identity, respect for the rule of law, language and the value of citizenship. When national identities are weakened and citizenship loses its meaning, other sources of collective identity – such as religious identity – become more prevalent. Religiosity, or religious orthodoxy as such, is not problematic and is quite often an important element in healthy

citizenship. What is problematic is the sort of loss of the rational that increases uncertainty and allows political fanaticism – currently radical Islamism – to spread with ease. The consequences of this are twofold: it is principally a cultural and social problem that affects awareness, citizenship and security. But when social irrationality leads to political irrationality, policy will become short-sighted and devoid of any strategy, and capable of being manipulated by those with hostile intent.

The loss of the rational in Western societies can be identified as part of a larger cultural trend that makes such societies more vulnerable, and it has many symptoms ranging from the innocuous to the fanatical. The cult of celebrity, focused on pop artists and athletes, is a more innocent symptom of this wider cultural phenomenon. In some Western societies, faith in purely irrational belief systems has overtaken belief in religions that have moral and rational substance, as well as cultural roots. But symptoms such as the decline of interest in science reflect an intellectual decline that might have more immediately palpable social consequences in areas such as journalism, law, and even public health. It reflects a more general loss of respect for the value of evidence and argument. As a direct consequence of the globalisation of information flows, all kinds of irrational belief or political fanaticism circulate freely in the public domain. Traits of the open society, such as freedom of speech, can then be used against themselves and against other liberties.

Taken together, these symptoms enhance the political frivolity of large parts of the developed world's populations, leaving people intellectually, culturally and politically vulnerable. The loss of the value of citizenship and the increase in irrationality together create the space in which public opinion is shaped emotionally, making sound strategy and policy harder to ac-

compish. It also creates the space for demagoguery to thrive. The loss of the rational, in other words, is a loss of a particularly valuable part of intellectual and moral certainty, and it can lead people to seek certainty elsewhere, in anything from common cults to extreme cases of fanaticism.

To trust in one's rational faculty means to question and to endure doubt. Sometimes the fear of doubt can be stronger than the fear of death, when extreme doubt leads someone to be receptive to the extreme certainty of a violent ideology – the most fashionable of which (though by no means the only one) is currently radical Islamism.

The attraction of radical Islamism is similar to the psychological appeal of other secular totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, in that it dispels all doubt. In the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, ideology often took the place of religion and, in some cases, replaced the divine with the tyrant himself – a bizarre idolatry still to be witnessed in the personality cult of North Korea. But where National Socialism appealed to racial identity, and Communism appealed to underclass and egalitarian sentiment – radical Islamism appeals to a religious identity and places political violence into a narrative of religious duty.

The varieties of radical Islamism are principally political. But because they appeal to religious identity, members of Muslim communities in the West who have an uncertain mix of national identities and a weak sense of citizenship may be inordinately attracted to the certainty that fanaticism can offer.

It is important to stress that these Western cultural weaknesses are not the cause of Islamist terror. They merely represent the vulnerability that makes societies receptive to its ideological and violent onslaughts by believing that they

themselves are to blame. The active sources of radical Islamism are many, from the state sponsorship of radicalism by Saudi Arabia and Iran, to non-state organisations like Hezbollah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots Al-Qaeda and Hamas, as well as the propaganda freely available on the internet.

These different sources of propaganda and/or violence vary in their intellectual underpinnings, sectarian and political aims, and in their internationalist or nationalist orientations. But what they have in common is an assault on the values of the West – on its democratic processes and its freedom of religion – and an exultation over the murder of Jews, Americans, Hindus, ‘unbelievers’, ‘infidels’, ‘apostates’ and various ‘inferior’ others. Notwithstanding the common perception in the West, the origin of Islamist terrorism is not victimhood, nor an inferiority complex, but a well-financed superiority complex grounded in a violent political ideology.

The cultural problem of the loss of the rational is broader than we can describe here, but it creates room for the spread of fanatical political movements contrary to rational values, and weakens the awareness without which political and strategic resolve is not possible.

If the irrational and fanatical get out of hand, there is a risk that, in the long term, the instability of uncertainties, the rise of fundamentalisms and despotisms will usher in a new, illiberal age, in which the liberties that Western societies enjoy – but will not defend – are seriously jeopardised.

Scale and Complexity

The defence and security challenges the world faces today are

very serious, but are very different from the challenges we have previously known – such as those posed by Fascism or Communism. In its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon called the post-9/11 global conflict the ‘Long War’ against ‘dispersed non-state networks’. This definition of the conflict reflects the scale of the threat, but not its complexity, and it does not address the means of coping with the threat. The novelty of this ‘global age’ is the way in which threats and security challenges are interlinked, e.g. energy security, climate change, information technology, financial capital flows, armed conflict, radical and Islamist terrorism, organised crime, proliferation, scarce resources, and refugee issues. All are interconnected in an unprecedented fashion. In addition, other trends act as a multiplier for specific threats. Demographic trends affect urbanisation, crime and terrorism. Climate change affects refugee issues and economic interests. Ideological trends and nationalism affect terrorism, crime and social instability. Technological change, ease of movement and interconnected economies all help to amplify local problems into regional and even global crises.

We are not merely in a ‘long war’ against networks of terrorist or non-state actors; the West faces a complex, mutable, unstable combination of specific threats against a background of larger trends. The complexity and the interrelated character of these changing threats and trends place much of the risk beyond the scope of predictability. Given that many challenges are a part of general trends, and that specific threats can be carried out by means that are both non-military and irregular – such as cyber attack – it does not make sense to speak of a ‘war’, because to cope with the situation we need much more than military instruments alone.

What the Western allies face is a long, sustained and proactive defence of their societies and way of life. To that end, they

must keep risks at a distance, while at the same time protecting their homelands.

This sustained defence concerns the physical safety of citizens, territory and interests, legal culture and liberty. It will be played out in many theatres, and will cover many policy domains that have traditionally been kept separate from each other. Understanding how different matters are interrelated is a very important first step in beginning to be able to address them effectively.

It will require great patience, nerve and tenacity; it will demand both a willingness to strike hard with military force when necessary, and a determination not to succumb to the temptation to compromise one's own values – a principle aim of terrorism and insurgencies.

Appreciating the complexity of interrelated problems and regional dimensions is a first step towards assessing what capabilities are required. The challenges facing Afghanistan represent a combination of terrorism and organised crime, involving drug trafficking and illegal arms trading, in a wider regional dimension, where radicalisation is rife. Terrorism and sectarian instability are actively advanced by both non-state actors and regional players.

The ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the current force structures of most Western nations are not fully capable of meeting today's military challenges. While NATO members are investing in new capabilities, most of these are designed for the defence of the NATO Treaty Area. In the main, NATO members are not willing to invest in the new capabilities that are required today, and defence budgets still do not reflect new priorities. This is partly because of European nations' unwillingness to face up to the current

threats and challenges. The most recent example of this is the lack of will to fund what was to be the flagship of NATO's transformation – the NATO Response Force. Western nations need to rethink their security posture and recognise the gaps in the military and other capabilities.

The West, as we noted in the Introduction, relies heavily on the Indian software industry, and thus on Indian stability; China is capable of damaging the American and world economies by cashing in its huge dollar reserves; Russia is able to stop a very large part of the gas supply to Europe. In 2007 we witnessed a cyber attack on Estonia, launched either using the capabilities of a state or by individuals acting anonymously. While NATO lawyers tried to figure out whether this last example constituted an attack according to Article 5, the EU and NATO failed to rally to Estonia's defence. This attack made NATO think about cyber security, and the alliance is currently exploring ways of improving strategic defences in cyberspace – and it may consider other uses of cyber technology as well.

These examples illustrate a new form of warfare that abuses leverage in finance, energy and information technology. War could be waged without a single bullet being fired, and the implications of this need to become part of strategic and operational thinking. The threats that the West and its partners face today are a combination of violent terrorism against civilians and institutions, wars fought by proxy by states that sponsor terrorism, the behaviour of rogue states, the actions of organised international crime, and the coordination of hostile action through abuse of non-military means.

The nature of these dangerous and complex challenges cannot be dealt with by military means alone. The Western world and its allies need to agree a new concerted strategy that

would include the use of all available instruments, and to prepare its capabilities for those global and regional challenges that we can predict, as well as those we cannot.

| Global Challenges

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Proliferation

The ever growing demand for energy will inevitably lead to a significant increase in nuclear power for non-military use. This is desirable for economic and environmental reasons – but it will lead to major security risks. The temptation to enrich uranium beyond civilian use, and to divert the by-product plutonium, is certain to grow and undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Therefore, a rigid control and verification regime by international organisations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other voluntary ad hoc cooperation initiatives and enforcement mechanisms (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee and others) and, above all, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) will remain essential.

Should the world fail to find a solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions, the NPT could be damaged beyond repair and nuclear weapons proliferation could spread. An Iranian nuclear weapons capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States. Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world.

The nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan have produced some regional stability, but also a new set of risks and uncertainties. The 'private' proliferation network of A. Q. Khan, which played a key role in developing Pakistan's nuclear capability, also sold centrifuge designs to Iran, North Korea and Libya, and had offered them to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In 2003, the dismantling of the A. Q. Khan network and Libya's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes was a major achievement, but several significant risks still remain. Given that many alumni of the A. Q. Khan network remain free, the threat of a very dangerous black market in nuclear weapons technology will remain.

In particular, the greatest risk is that, if Pakistan were to become a failing state, it would be a failing state with nuclear weapons.

Although nuclear proliferation is currently in the foreground, the dangers of proliferation in chemical weapons, biological weapons, radiological weapons and missile technology have not abated. At present, 25 countries possess WMD. Of these, 17 possess active offensive chemical weapons capabilities and 12 possess offensive biological weapons. Around 70 countries possess missiles with a range of over 1,500 km, and around 12 nations export such weapons. Counteracting these threats will require the use of all available instruments.

At the moment, this is done through a combination of treaties and ad hoc arrangements. In addition to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, there are ad hoc arrangements, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime. At present, the most important ad hoc arrangement to counter all of these threats is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to enforce counter-proliferation by air and naval interdiction,

where other control regimes fail or leave gaps. The PSI is hugely important and has had several important successes; but it currently has no formal institutional basis, and nor does it have a clear strategic direction. Proliferation of all kinds of WMD, their related dual-use technologies and the means to deliver them, will remain one of the most acute security challenges in the coming decades. Addressing these threats effectively will require deeper and wider cooperation and a more comprehensive approach.

The Struggle for Scarce Resources

There will be an increase in global competition for scarce resources, and this will certainly be the case for fossil fuel, which will swell the possibility of suppliers abusing their position and their leverage. The investment and research into alternative sources of energy, from an increase in nuclear power to experiments with hydrogen technology and varieties of biofuel, are expected to grow and to be encouraged. Scarce resources, such as rare and essential minerals that are mined in remote parts of the world risk becoming a source of political instability, rather than a benefit to the local populations.

With global demographic and economic growth will come a rising global demand for oil – the annual average increase is expected to be 2 per cent over the next 20 years. The increased use of nuclear energy this century will lead to a rise in the demand for uranium. Given that China and India will play a significant part in this growth in demand, they will become increasingly influential and competitive nations.

Other alternative sources of energy, such as biofuels, liquefied coal, hydrogen technology and wind power are to be encouraged. Switching an entire economy to hydrogen, however,

would be extremely expensive and, though it may become more economically viable in the future, the practicability of this remains uncertain. In addition, biofuel from palm oil, sugarcane and other sources is still more expensive than fossil fuel. American research into these areas, however, is making real progress, and the USA may become less dependent on the import of fossil materials. The risks of energy security are, therefore, likely to remain more acute for Europe and Asia than for America.

Energy security is linked to political alignments, environmental and economic issues and political liberty. Dependency on oil and gas is a vulnerability that some governments will seek to exploit – the Gazprom crisis demonstrated how easily demand can be manipulated. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is – and is likely to remain – a mechanism for keeping the price of oil artificially high, and recently Russia and the United Arab Emirates have been exploring the idea of setting up a ‘Gas OPEC’.

At present, energy security and energy policy are the responsibility of each sovereign nation. The European Union is currently developing a common energy policy, which concentrates on reduced emissions, on efficiency targets and on subsidising biofuel and securing diversification of energy sources by trade arrangements. There is no discussion about the protection of energy sources and of their means of transportation. The European Union is using soft instruments, and this is unlikely to protect energy security, which will require deeper transatlantic cooperation and coordination. For this reason, it might well be worth considering using NATO as an instrument of energy security.

In some cases, valuable natural resources are in countries that are plagued by civil war and so do not benefit the ordinary

citizens. Rare but essential minerals also offer organised criminals great opportunities and leverage. For instance, coltan (the ore for the rare metal tantalum, which is essential for cellular phones and laptop computers) is mined illegally in northern Congo and smuggled out by militias. In Nigeria and Sierra Leone, rare natural resources are controlled by gangs and rebels; this, of course, means that these groups have a potentially global impact.

Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare

In the globalised world, the non-state or proxy-state actor has added to world instability and, in some cases, is linked to organised crime. A globalised 'asymmetry' can pose a wide range of significant threats to governments and to a nation's security forces. Asymmetric threats can range from direct military action at home or abroad to international terrorists seeking to cause mass casualties; in some instances, sources of asymmetric threats – such as insurgents – are linked to sophisticated international crime. It is important to recognise that the threat may well be a combination of the economic, military, terrorist and criminal. The challenges are all the greater because democratic nations observe international law and conventions, while the 'other side' has no such scruples, thus causing a discrepancy in *jus in bello*. Israel's 2006 war against Hezbollah was an armed conflict between a proxy non-state actor and a nation state, where the nation state was at a great disadvantage. Hezbollah did not shy away from war crimes: it positioned its militia in the midst of civilians and launched rockets from residential areas. And all the while it mounted a relentless and tightly controlled propaganda campaign.

Waging war 'among the people' is not new. Blurring the boundary between soldier and civilian was part of the Spanish

guerrilla action against Napoleon and the IRA's war against the British, and it remains a tactic of terrorist organisations today. But this tactic today, with very modern weapons, leads to far more casualties among innocent civilians. Examples of asymmetric war fought by proxy today include the very significant support Iran gives to Shiite militias in Iraq, and its supply of arms and training to Hezbollah. The support from Iran (and possibly Syria) and the presence of Al-Qaeda and former Ba'athist regime elements in Iraq, whether murdering civilians and military personnel or destroying institutions, illustrate very starkly the major challenge of fighting a coordinated campaign against an asymmetric threat.

We have to recognise that international terrorism and the threat of asymmetric war are likely to remain with us for a very long time. This is a very different challenge from the terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof group, the Basque-separatist ETA or the IRA. International terrorism today aims to disrupt and destroy our societies, our economies and our way of life. It was a surprising leap of imagination on the part of terrorists to use aeroplanes as missiles, to time bombings ahead of elections, and to use the global media to achieve maximum impact.

In addition, the distinction between international organised crime and terrorism is becoming increasingly blurred. There is a fundamental difference between the political aims of terrorists and international criminals' pursuit of money, but their activities should not be viewed in isolation. Some terrorist organisations are involved in the drug and arms trade, and organised criminals may begin to pursue political power – as is demonstrated by the symbiosis between the drug trade, the arms trade and asymmetric warfare in and around Afghanistan.

The Cold War helped control the sale of weapons; but that

weaponry is now readily available on the black market. Given that non-state and proxy-state actors deliberately violate all principles governing the conduct of war, blurring the distinction between soldiers and civilians both as actors and in their choice of targets, the response to these threats will inevitably change, depending on where the lines of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* are drawn.

Abuse of Financial Leverage

A dangerous consequence of globalisation is that financial leverage may increase political instability. For example, China is again seeking access to the mineral resources of Africa, and pursues its resource security by buying political support from regimes, for example China outclassed the World Bank's offer of \$5 billion to renovate Nigeria's railway system with an \$8.3 billion offer to rebuild the rail network from scratch.

This phenomenon has also been called 'rogue aid'², and it affects Africa's relationship to the rest of the world. In addition to oil interests in Nigeria, Sudan and Angola, China has exploration agreements with Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania and Algeria, and a production stake in Tunisia. China is also pursuing minerals, including platinum, copper, iron ore, uranium and diamonds across the continent. Furthermore, it is investing in infrastructure projects, undercutting Western competitors and development banks, building hydropower dams in Sudan, Ethiopia, Zambia, Mozambique, Ghana, Nigeria and Congo-Brazzaville; railways in Angola, Zambia, Congo, Gabon and Sudan; and telephone networks in Morocco, Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya, Angola and Zimbabwe.

² 'Rogue Aid', *Foreign Policy* March/April 2007; IISS, 'China in Africa', Strategic Comments vol. 13 issue 05.

At \$99.4 billion in 2006, America is still Africa's largest trading partner, but China's oil purchases from Africa have multiplied five times since 2000 to stand at \$55.5 billion in 2006; this figure is expected to double in the next three years.

China is in a position to use the 'finance weapon' for geopolitical leverage in Africa, and is gaining the capability to use it more widely – if it chooses to do so.

There are less significant examples of 'rogue aid': from Venezuela's foreign aid to the Cuban regime, to Russians buying up railway stations in Switzerland. Leverage and deterrence by non-military means can be a threat, and it is one that is growing. The danger is that it may empower despots and encourage corruption, rather than improving the lives of ordinary citizens.

The use of resources, and also of financial instruments gained from resource wealth, as a new instrument of political coercion will increase as a political problem in the coming century, and this adds a new, non-military dimension to threat and security analysis. To respond effectively, and with a proper strategy, will mean extending the meaning of strategy beyond the military domain.

| Regional Challenges

The United Nations recognise approximately 500 nationalities, of which some 140 live on the territory of a state governed by a different nationality. This is the basic reason behind the continuing very large number of unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts, both interstate and intra-state. They include Cyprus, the Arab–Israeli conflicts, Kosovo, Arab–

African violence and genocide in Darfur and southern Sudan; the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea; the Sunni and Shia conflicts; Syria and Lebanon; the Iranian–Arab tensions within Iran; Russian–Chinese rivalry; Turkish–Kurdish violence; Zimbabwe’s systematic starvation of political opposition; the Nigerian civil war; and many others. These conflicts (together with the associated refugee crises) swell the list of long-term challenges: a number are connected to the competition for resources, nuclear proliferation, economic competition, terrorism and the balance of power.

The role of the United States in Europe has changed in recent years, but it remains vital for European interests. In the volatile Middle East, the complexity of interrelated problems will require significant involvement for years to come. In Asia, the rise of China, India and Indonesia as regional powers is bringing new economic, financial and military challenges, and the Asia-Pacific region remains the only region where the balancing power of the US offsets these challenges in a traditional way. It is probably correct to say that the strategic centre of gravity has shifted from the Atlantic toward the Middle East and the Pacific, and this will have many consequences, not least for Europe’s role in the world.

In this section, we will focus on four major regional challenges: the rise of Asia, the dangerous Middle East, Africa and state failure, and the reappearance of Russia.

Rise of Asia

The significant economic growth of China and India and the steady rise of Indonesia have already had profound economic global consequences, illustrated by major external investment and Western dependency on manufacturing and services, af-

fecting market and currency stability and access to scarce resources. China and India are becoming dominant regional powers, investing heavily in military and nuclear capabilities and pumping vast amounts of money into Africa. It has been estimated that, if current economic growth rates are maintained over the next two decades, China will have the second largest economy by 2020, and the largest by 2027. It seems unlikely, however, that China can maintain these growth rates because of weaknesses concerning governance, environmental, demographic, geographic and maritime factors. India and China are both trying to maximise the political influence of their economic power, but in opposite ways: India in cooperation with the USA, and China in competition.

China has very greatly increased its defence expenditure (\$103 billion in 2005, \$122 billion in 2006), and has also significantly boosted its nuclear capabilities, naval forces and military use of outer space.

The country has realised that it needs to be a maritime power in order to protect its nuclear capabilities and its maritime lines of communication. To that end, it is seeking alternative options for maritime access, through collaboration with the propped-up regime of Myanmar (Burma) and with Pakistan, in order to circumvent the Malacca Straits, which could easily be blockaded.

This will complicate relations with the US and India, while the uncertain future of Taiwan has the potential to become an even more dangerous flashpoint.

The leadership of China almost certainly considers the US its principal opponent, but it is unlikely that a new Cold War is looming. The difference between the Soviet Union and China is that the Soviet Union was economically weak,

whereas China is economically strong – and is dependent on the US to maintain this economic power.

China will aim to straddle the delicate balance between transforming this economic rise into military expansion, while cooperating with Asian nations within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and avoiding a confrontation with the US.

One of the principal weaknesses of the Chinese expansion, as was noted above in the section on climate change, is the damage it is doing to its own environment. The scale of this damage, and its corresponding economic disutility, should not be underestimated. China is presently constructing around two coal-fired power stations *a week*. (And worldwide, approximately 3,000 such power stations are planned by 2030.) This may be good Chinese energy security, but it is a disaster in terms of the pollution of its own soil, the health of its citizens and the state of the world as a whole. The Chinese government will soon be confronted with a difficult choice – whether or not it is willing to reduce the country's economic growth in the interests of a better environmental policy, before the environmental damage negatively affects that very growth directly. It does seem that current high rates of growth will not be sustained indefinitely, especially when the demographics of the ageing population begin to have an economic impact.

In China, as elsewhere, there is a decline of Communism as an ideology. But whether economic liberalisation will lead to political liberalisation is not clear, because the country's structure remains communist, while the economic elite is largely made up of children of the Party elite. Economic growth will not liberalise a country if this growth is largely controlled by the state, rather than being a part of civil society. There the internet is severely restricted in its liberalising potential, both

on account of censorship and because it is treated by the state as an instrument of surveillance. In addition, an offensive cyber-force has recently been constituted that reports only to the Party, which may be an indication that there will be an increased emphasis on cyber operations in the future.

When asked about the role of the Chinese armed forces, Chinese military officials will say that China's army is like that of any other nation – there to protect its borders and interests. But, when pressed in private, they will admit that, in addition to their many ambitions, the army principally serves to maintain order within the country.

India will not necessarily be as restrained as China in its regional dealings. The relationship between India and Pakistan is likely to remain difficult, and India's relationship with Indonesia is not without tension. Muslim–Hindu violence or fanaticism, anywhere in the region, could further exacerbate unpleasant tensions between these states.

The case of Japan is very different from other countries in the region, because, since the end of the second World War, Japanese security has been fully integrated into the West, with a very strong link to the US, both on the military and political levels. This makes Japan a reliable ally against the danger from North Korea, but the attitude of India and China to Japanese security remains unclear.

The rise of Asia is shifting much of the strategic focus to the Pacific, which means that European nations need to think hard about their role in the world, as well as about the role that the transatlantic alliance has in the Pacific.

Dangerous Middle East

The Middle East is the region where most of the challenges described above converge simultaneously. Local ethnic clashes with a regional dimension, the threat of proliferation, the spread of radical Islamist terrorism and the instability surrounding access to oil and gas resources – all are intertwined. The ebb and flow of the risk of a civil war in Iraq, Kurdish–Turkish violence, nuclear aspirations and active sectarian meddling by Iran all add to regional uncertainty. These factors have greatly affected US credibility, which remains the indispensable resource for regional stability.

In addition, all the efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflicts have been unsuccessful. One of the most dramatic changes since 9/11 and the war in Iraq has been that this conflict is no longer considered to be the pivot around which all Middle Eastern problems revolve. Solving this conflict is very important, and President Bush is the first American head of state openly to call for the creation of a Palestinian state. But when it comes to the more fundamental question of whether the Palestinian problem would be solved by creating a state, there is more consensus in the West than in the region itself.

The dramatic difference with the recent past is that the most currently volatile conflict in the Middle East is between the Sunni and the Shia. Iraq and Lebanon are two theatres of this conflict, and it also encompasses the regional rivalry between pro-American Sunni allies and Shiite Iran.

The willingness of the USA and its coalition partners to rid the world of the two terrible regimes of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Taliban has left a vacuum that Iran is stepping into, with the world unable to contain Iran's growing influ-

ence in the region. The savage sectarian violence, the deliberate destabilisation of Iraq by its neighbours, plus a significant Al-Qaeda presence all pose a very great challenge to the government of Iraq and the coalition. This instability has allowed Iran to step in, even as it launches a uranium enrichment process and is strongly suspected of engaging in a military nuclear programme. Iran has long wanted to become a very significant regional power, and as such it would undoubtedly threaten the geopolitical balance in the Gulf and be keen to fan the flames between the Sunni and Shia throughout the Muslim world.

As a nuclear power, Iran could become immune to international sanctions. Furthermore, it would dominate the region, which possesses the world's largest oil and gas reserves. Moreover, an Iranian nuclear weapon could mean the end of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus transform the regional conflict into a global crisis.

Achieving regional stability – which includes finding a solution to the Israeli–Arab conflicts – can only be accomplished at a higher strategic level. Solutions will lie in newer regional balances, which will have to include key strategic interests, such as questions of proliferation and access to raw materials.

Africa and State Failure

We have discussed Africa in the context of civil war, ethnic violence and demographic challenges, climate change, hunger, disease, corruption, resources and 'rogue aid'. Africa is a region where many of these challenges are interconnected; but, speaking very broadly, we might say that the continent is a theatre in the early stages of a global competition between

Western nations, China and the Islamic world³ – a much more complex predicament for Africa than during the Cold War.

Africa remains the poorest continent, although in the past three years African economic growth has averaged around 5 per cent annually. This is, in part, due to the economic boost received from China, the benefits of debt cancellation, aid from the G8 and increased aid from the European Union.

Nonetheless, this rate of economic growth is still insufficient to deal with the big increase in population from 900 million now to 2 billion by 2050. Generally speaking, the African continent is not in good shape, and the lack of good governance is the main reason for this situation, which has led to several problems. First, there is internal instability in many countries, and quite often also state failure, causing the troubles to spread. The consequences of civil war and genocide in the 1990s in the Great Lakes area are still felt, and this is an area where a Western presence to oversee stability and the conduct of elections will remain for some time to come. In addition, there are many problems related to AIDS and other diseases; trafficking in arms, drugs and people; and in some countries, the threat of Islamist radicalism.

Zimbabwe is gradually being destroyed by a tyrannical regime that is using dispossession and systematic starvation – akin to North Korea's tactics in the 1990s – to eliminate its political opposition (this is also considered a form of genocide, as defined by the Genocide Convention of 1948, Art. II c). Unfortunately, Zimbabwe's misconduct is enabled by the support it receives from South Africa, and there is a grave risk that similar developments might occur in Namibia.

³ IISS, *Strategic Survey 2006*, pp. 246–266; IISS, 'AFRICOM', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 13 issue 2.

The violence and ethnic cleansing in Darfur – with over 200,000 killed, 2.5 million displaced and more than 1,600 villages destroyed⁴ – is genocide, largely carried out by proxies of the Sudanese regime, supported by Sudanese air cover, to rid Sudan of its black population and replace them with ethnic Arabs. The economic prosperity of the oil-rich Sudanese regime has been as destabilising to the country and the region as economic and political failure has been in Somalia, where it has coincided with radicalised Islamism. The state where the greatest risk exists of a failing state turning into a launching pad for terrorism and WMD is Somalia.

There is, furthermore, a real danger that radical Islamist movements spread among Africa's 400 million Muslims. This is currently a concern in Sudan, Somalia and Nigeria, but has so far not been a problem in the moderate Islamic regions of West and Central Africa.

There are some important exceptions to these worrying trends. First, those countries that are oil and gas producers, such as Gabon and Angola, can take advantage of their political and economic relationship with North America. Liberia, though not an energy producer, is benefiting from a turn towards good governance and its good relationship with the United States. Second, the African countries on the Mediterranean coast are in a better situation, because they are part of the EUROMED partnership, established in 1995 in Barcelona. These countries derive benefits, even if they are insufficient, from cooperation with the European Union, but they are confronted by the threats of Islamist movements.

⁴ Estimates of the number of dead vary from 150,000 to over 400,000, of which the low end principally concerns those died from the violence and the high end also includes those who died of disease and malnutrition after displacement. The number of destroyed villages is based on satellite imagery accessible through Google Earth and analysis by www.geocommons.com.

Western activities in Africa are currently a combination of European soft power and American hard power. France remains the largest trading partner of the continent, but the US is not far behind. As was mentioned earlier, China is currently flooding Africa both with investment and with Chinese products. While Europe and America make their aid and support conditional upon improving governance standards, China (as has already been mentioned) makes no such demands, and its financial leverage over the continent is already proving to be detrimental to good governance, in its disregard for democracy and human rights.

The United States has, in recent years, shifted its dependency on gas and oil imports from the Middle East to Africa. As a consequence of this increased interest in Africa, the US is in the process of establishing the US African Command (AFRICOM), to protect its strategic interests. It is increasing energy investment and is seeking to counteract radicalisation among Africa's Muslims. Although AFRICOM will not be fully operational until September 2008, its activities will principally focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, cooperation with the African Union and strengthening military–military relationships. Its establishment reveals an increased strategic interest in Africa on the part of the US.

In addition, in the realm of security, the African Union and some sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS⁵ are trying to increase their role in maintaining stability. The EU countries, especially France and the UK, can provide the technical and logistical support in order to increase the efficiency of the interventions carried out by African organisations.

⁵ Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), a.k.a, La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CDEAO).

American and European challenges and interests in Africa are not entirely similar. The USA is principally interested in access to oil and raw materials, and in this regard it is competing with China. Europe also deals with these questions, but it is mainly concerned with migration and stability in Northern Africa and the Sahel region. The main challenge for the Europeans is to agree on a comprehensive policy that could change the situation in this part of Africa through security cooperation, economic growth and good governance. The United States and Europe, although their strategic interests in Africa are not identical, could still cooperate more on common aims, such as achieving stability in Africa and offsetting the influence of China and radical Islamism.

The Reappearance of Russia

One of the interesting features of the 21st century is the reappearance of Russia, something that has economic, nationalist and authoritarian aspects. Low birth rates, high death rates, combined with multi-ethnicity and the threat of Central Asian Islamist radicalism, all put a greater strain on its national identity, fuelling a backlash of Russian nationalism, which has consequences that are anti-democratic domestically and globally anti-liberal. The rise of China is both an economic and a demographic problem for Russia, which will contract demographically.

Russia is offsetting these developments with its restored economic standing, and is using this economic power and energy leverage to advance its aspirations to be the second global superpower once again. With strong exports in energy and armaments, the economic rise has been accompanied by renewal in the Russian military. On closer examination, however, there is a mismatch between Russian rhetoric and actual

capabilities; it is Russia's weakness that is a cause for concern in the West, no longer its strength.

Historically, Russia has been dangerous as a great power – but it has also been dangerous whenever it has felt that it is not being treated *as* a great power. Many Russians cannot believe that the West has anything other than hostile intent, and they believe the West wants to sweep their country aside from its 'deserved' position as second global superpower (something it is not and never will be again). Russia generally feels disappointed by its cooperation with the West, and especially by the NATO–Russia partnership, which it interpreted as a guarantee that Russia could influence all NATO decisions. A more assertive, and at times hostile, foreign policy posture has emerged in recent years as a result of this, but also as a result of the alumni of the former KGB controlling the government and all other instruments of coercion. There may be uncertainty about the successor to President Putin, but, whoever it may be, the West's interest in striving for partnership with Russia will remain important.

In contrast to the United States, Europe depends on Russian gas and oil imports, and is, in addition, vulnerable to the renewed Russian development of authoritarianism. The country's leverage and financial standing are principally based on its export of raw materials and armaments – both industries that are controlled by the state. Unlike India and China, it does not have much else to offer the world in terms of services or manufacturing. It is not Russia's strength that its economic growth is almost entirely at the state level rather than as a part of civil society.

Russia has used its economic growth to improve the condition of its military capabilities. Russia has approximately 1.134 million military personnel. It is envisaged that by 2008 two-

thirds will be regulars, and conscription will then be reduced to 12 months. Russia spends 2.6 to 2.8 per cent of GDP on defence (approximately \$24 billion); by 2011, some 50 per cent of that should be spent on running costs, and the other half on modernisation and equipment. From 2010 to 2015, further reorganisation is planned, with abolition of the current Military Districts. The new organisation will correspond to the three operational directions Russia believes it needs: the Far East, Central Asia and Western Europe.

Russia possesses a capable industrial base, and it exports \$7 billion worth of military technology to 82 countries (planning figure 2007). Looking at today's military capabilities, there seems to be a mismatch between President Putin's political statements and the realities. A few examples: according to Russian force planning, all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are supposed to be Topol-M missiles by 2015, but the annual production rate is seven missiles. In the air force, just half of the aircraft are operational, 55 per cent are older than 15 years, and new aircraft procurement is very low. Looking at air defence, Russia would need some 650 S-300 missiles, but only around 100 are operational. Overall, not much more than 20 per cent of the Russian military equipment can be called modern, and 15 to 20 per cent of all materiel can be classified as not operational.

When it comes to personnel, the Russian Armed Forces are definitely not in good shape. They are still top heavy in their personnel structure, and they are increasingly struggling to maintain military discipline and sufficient morale to enable them to fight and sustain combat operations.

For the next 10 to 15 years, the Russian military will continue to struggle with reform, and not many of the objectives set out by President Putin in his May 2006 speech will be

achieved. For all of these reasons, it is fair to say that today it is not the strength of Russia's military that is a cause for concern, but rather its weakness. It is in the interests of both the West and Russia, therefore, to increase cooperation at the political and the military levels. The trends within Russia that are pushing hard in the opposite direction are a cause for great concern.

In the region, Georgia and Ukraine remain unresolved issues, and their potential NATO or EU membership will remain controversial and highly contentious. Relations with Russia are also bound up with the status of Kosovo: the West's unilateral recognition of Kosovo – against the will of Serbia, Russia and China – could further strain relations between the West and Russia, and between the West and China. Setting a precedent for part of a country to secede against the will of that country could encourage separatism in other territorial disputes and thus increase the risk of further conflicts.

It will be important for the West to maintain a partnership with Russia, if an escalation of future tensions is to be averted. Cooperation with Russia must be based on strict reciprocity, and Russia should never be given a unilateral veto over Western decisions; but Western nations should take account of legitimate Russian interests in their security arrangements. In this context, it is important to maintain the existing arms control agreements, such as the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), and to explore options with Russia for the future of arms control.

| Conclusion

As we have indicated, trends, risks, dangers and specific threats cannot be seen in isolation from each other. Because there are fewer geographical limitations to a problem, a viable risk assessment must be global. It is necessary to appreciate the interlinking complexity of the present challenges and their potentially huge scale. It is a hallmark of the globalised world that threats are multi-faceted and multi-directional. We have to formulate a strategic response that matches the complexities we face.

War never was the application of military force alone. But today, non-military means have a more prominent role to play than ever before. In addition to conventional military and nuclear balances of power, asymmetric threats will be used more frequently. States or non-state actors may well start conflicts by proxy, by abusing their leverage in energy resources, or through the financial 'weapon'. There exists a great – and unprecedented – danger that multiple players could wage war on the West by deploying these various instruments simultaneously. Therefore, there is a strategic risk that we could see warfare that does not involve the use of a single bullet.

These threats are a new phenomenon, and we must be prepared to develop a set of responses that go beyond military capabilities and that can be applied at the strategic level, thus providing the capability to deal with the unexpected. What is needed is an approach to strategy that integrates all the instruments available to a given nation. But because no nation can handle these challenges on its own, we need to tackle them through alliances as well. The integrated and the allied approaches are central to our proposals.

But what about our international institutions? Do they have

the capability and the political will to cope with the problems discussed above? In the next chapter we will consider the capabilities our nations possess today.



Present Capabilities

In Chapter 1 we considered possible challenges and threats. The question immediately arises whether we are able to deal with these in an adequate way. Are UN institutions, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the EU and nation states capable of dealing with these demands? Do their present capabilities meet the new challenges and threats?

If we look at recent conflicts, like Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan, it appears that those institutions and the coalition nations have great difficulty in coming up with a proper integrated and allied approach. This leads to inadequate strategic concepts and an inability to establish an efficient political–military decision-making and execution mechanism.

It is these that are crucially needed to cope with complex challenges and threats, as we discussed in Chapter 1. This need is reinforced by the nature of those challenges and threats, because they lead to much longer involvements.

There was strong common resolve within NATO during the Cold War – a resolve that dissipated all too quickly after that war unravelled. Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo have revealed problems for the UN and NATO that should have taught us lessons. These lessons – if learnt – seem not to have been followed up by full, appropriate, corrective measures. The structural problems that we experienced in the political resolve and in the political–military decision-making mechanisms during the Bosnian intervention still haunt NATO today.

The biggest problems that the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have had in common have been the absence of a properly defined political objective, the absence of an integrated and allied strategy to achieve that objective, and the absence of capabilities to implement the strategy. In addition, nations have commonly imposed too many national caveats on use of their forces. There exists an unwillingness on the part of nations to transfer authority to the operational commander once in the theatre of operations. Finally, there is a tendency for nations not to resource operations effectively – in terms of both personnel and materiel – which serves to undermine the one factor that preoccupies the military circles of NATO nations today: sustainability.

These examples underline the need not only for a careful and integrated decision-making process, but also for specific capabilities; especially the ability to carry operations through for longer periods of time, across a wide spectrum of activities. There were many problems in past operations and very few lessons were heeded, so that structural and political problems remain unresolved to this day.

Below, we will consider the lessons of recent experience and what this means for national and shared capabilities, for sustainability, and for the role of intelligence. But we will first consider the capabilities of the most important international organisations.

International Capabilities

United Nations

The United Nations (UN) should play a decisive role, but it is not capable of doing so. It has a broad range of capabilities, but it also has important limitations. When looking at the UN, we must distinguish three main roles.

First, the UN is the only institution that bestows the legitimacy of international law on international action that breaches national sovereignty. But political disunity, mainly between the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, is a major issue, while the General Assembly remains heavily influenced by non-democratic states.

Second, the UN has the capability of carrying out interventions, and it has been successful in several peacekeeping operations, such as in Cambodia, as well as in preventive action in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. But other UN interventions, such as in Bosnia or Somalia, have been a failure and have shown clearly that the UN is not capable of dealing with more complex military operations.

Third, specialised UN agencies, such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), function very well, and will continue to play an important and useful role.

The UN is an organisation with many capabilities, especially in non-military areas. However, the limitations in its political and political–military structure mean that it lacks an effective strategy, as well as the ability to live up to its stated purpose:

to preserve global security and prevent genocide.

It is also regrettable that the UN lacks order. A combination of insurmountable political disunities and executive incapacity precludes the organisation from possessing an effective strategy and political–military decision-making system. If the UN is seeking to be successful in operations that require a greater strategic and military dimension in the growing complexity of our modern world, then it will have to be assisted by other organisations.

Regional Organisations

In addition to the UN agencies, there are a number of regional organisations, some of them declared as such under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Outside Europe there exist the African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of American States (OAS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and others. These organisations intend to play a much greater role in the future. They might play a part in preventive crisis management, post-intervention stabilisation and nation building. Yet we see severe limitations in terms of the unity, will, capabilities and executive power of these organisations.

The one regional organisation that matters in terms of transatlantic security is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and it is useful in many respects. For example, the OSCE has a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. It is also suited to providing early warning of human rights abuses and ethnic strife, and also to post-intervention stabilisation and to monitoring elections. The OSCE does not, however, possess the capabilities to do anything in between, such as enforcing secu-

riety in crises when it is needed most. It also lacks a broad vision and a common strategy. Nevertheless, as one of the few organisations that can boast the membership of both Russia and the United States, it will play a valuable role in the future.

European Union

The European Union (EU) is a unique international organisation, partly supranational and partly a confederation. It has brought much economic prosperity to its citizens and, most importantly, has succeeded in maintaining peace and eliminating war among its members. The European Union also has quite a few political weaknesses, and it lacks unity, as well as important capabilities.

In areas of security and geopolitics, there are many internal differences concerning the status of the transatlantic alliance, the relationship with Russia, issues surrounding the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The EU Constitution, or the set of treaties recently accepted at Lisbon, may help facilitate cooperation in the security field and common policy. In Chapter 4, we will discuss how a reformed EU, with future executive institutions such as the EU presidency, might help in strengthening transatlantic bonds.

The European Union has important institutional capabilities, especially in terms of financial and economic resources, aid in the development of legal systems, protection of the environment and other instruments referred to as ‘soft power’, which require long-term development and planning. However, in time of crisis, when quick decisions are needed, it is hard to act with 27 nations. Both the procedures of the EU and the capabilities of its members are inadequate for present and future security challenges.

They are almost exclusively focused on soft power. There is no mature common security policy, and there is a surprising reluctance to address the issue of ‘hard power’, although a step in the right direction was taken in 2002 with the agreement of the European Security Strategy (ESS).

The threat assessment of the ESS focuses on terrorism, WMD, organised crime and failed states. One major oversight is that it leaves out the Cold War and the transatlantic alliance in its interpretation of recent history and contemporary politics.⁶

On the whole, the ESS makes an assessment about the nature of threats that is very similar to the American National Security Strategy (NSS); but the ESS differs markedly in the capabilities required to meet the threat. It also fails to mention the issue of pre-emption. It remains too loose a framework, the prerogative on decision making stays with the member states (which prevents a solid political–military decision-making and command structure in times of crisis) and it remains too focused on the application of soft power.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the most successful political organisation and military alliance in recent history, having managed to settle the Cold War peacefully and on its own terms. After the Cold War, it achieved remarkable success in the transition from confrontation to cooperation in Europe, and it has the potential to continue to be a successful political–military alliance. These are no small accomplishments. Although NATO does not

⁶ Francois Heisbourg, ‘The “European Security Strategy” is not a Security Strategy’ in *A European War of War* (CER 2004), pp. 27–40.

constitute the only legal transatlantic link, the North Atlantic Treaty specifies the only legally binding link between Europe and America on security – an obligation in Article 5 to undertake collective defence; in itself, that obligation has a particular deterrent effect.

However, despite this success, NATO faces serious challenges in Afghanistan and has lost the momentum required for transformation of its forces. NATO is, therefore, in danger of losing its credibility. In addition, the organisation seems to need an adequate vision for the future, including an effective strategic concept, that will lead to clear direction. It lacks capabilities, and its constituent nations are showing a marked lack of will for it to prevail. A NATO without profound reform will not be the instrument we need at this time or in the future.

Unlike the UN, the OSCE and the EU, NATO is a *political*–military alliance. This is both its strength and its weakness: it concentrates solely on military instruments, despite the fact that NATO members face threats that may be of a very unmilitary nature. NATO's effectiveness is further constrained by the differences of opinion between the US and Europe, as well as by differences within Europe about the role and use of war, about hard and soft power, and about the legality of armed intervention.

European NATO members are also divided among themselves about the size, role and scope of NATO. One important difference among Europeans concerns the range of NATO involvement: one view holds that NATO should be focused on Western security and should not extend its competence or its membership worldwide. In this vein, certain members are also opposed to extending NATO membership to non-North Atlantic nations, such as some of the democracies of the Pacific.

We believe that NATO should always remain open for future enlargement. But here some important lessons can be learnt from the expansion of NATO after the end of the Cold War. In considering future enlargement, NATO should take particular care not to fundamentally change the role and the nature of the alliance; not to dilute the fundamental principle of collective defence; and to conduct enlargement in such a manner that not only are objective criteria met, but that enlargement occurs as a part of wider strategic aims. We will return to this question in Chapter 4 and our vision for the future of NATO.

The Washington Summit of 1999 agreed NATO's present strategic concept, reaffirmed collective defence of the NATO Treaty Area and affirmed the importance of missions in the vicinity of the Balkans region. The Prague Summit Declaration of 2002 opened the door to using NATO for operations beyond the Treaty Area, calling for an ability to 'sustain operations over distance and time'. Together, these two agreements have created ambiguity about the role of the alliance, and the question of whether NATO should have a global or principally regional sphere of action continues to divide its members.

Leaving aside the fact that NATO has already acted decisively in Kosovo, without Security Council approval or assent, one of the important problems of the current strategic concept remains that NATO's actions are essentially reactive, rather than preventive, and are still limited to military means.

Overall, NATO will remain of central importance for the future of the transatlantic alliance, and will be the point of departure for the strategy we will describe in the next chapters. But in its political and military structure, decision-making mechanisms and military capabilities, NATO still greatly

reflects the needs of the Cold War, a dangerous period but one of relative stability – a stability and a period of the rule of international law that, considering past centuries, may well have been a historical anomaly and cannot be taken for granted today. The present fragility of the international systems can be a very unnerving realisation, especially for European nations.

Capabilities and Political Will

Public Awareness

In Chapter 1 we discussed the dilemma between relinquishing national sovereignty to international organisations, and maintaining a strong nation state. This affects general questions, ranging from political will and the freedom of nations to choose and decide, to practical matters such as placing troops under the operational command of other nations or international organisations.

The globalising world and its globalised threats and challenges, as discussed in Chapter 1, first require awareness – itself an act of intellectual and political courage – and the will to accept challenges and act on them. Both public awareness and political resolve have been very weak, and so the translation of this overall picture into future security policies is precluded. It is untenable that we are willing to pay more for security on flight tickets, and yet are unwilling to take care of security as a whole.

Western nations ought to take greater pride in their values of the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, freedom of

speech and the freedom of religion. In cases where these freedoms are abused in order to undermine them, there is a lack of will to defend them – and indeed a failure to appreciate what the West stands for. Ultimately, such will originates from within the nation state, rather than being imposed by any international organisation. If the West forgets what it stands for, then it becomes hard to discern what it is that Western nations have to offer the world.

Experiences and Observations

Having discussed the present state of various organisations, and having touched generally on issues concerning nations, it is worthwhile sharing some recent experiences and observations on their involvement in recent conflicts. What have been the problems at the strategic level, at the level of analysis and estimation of strength and weakness, and on the ground, where national command and multinational operational command both play their part?

Lacking a properly defined political objective, Western nations entered into operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq without having their clear end aims defined and without having any real integrated strategic and allied approach laid down in an integrated strategic framework. We believe that one of the reasons why it is so hard to come up with such a strategic concept is that there is too much ‘stove-piping’ in the decision-making processes. That is, each institution or each national department operates within its own narrow field of capabilities, without adequate communication or coordination with others. This also applies to domestic governance, when various ministries operate in parallel or in rivalry without proper coordination. This is one of the reasons why developing a clear integrated strategic concept is very difficult today.

Such an overall concept should work on the basis of clearly decided aims and goals. It should integrate all the participating and needed entities and elements, including political will. It should also distinguish phases of conflict and post-conflict, and clearly define responsibilities in each of them. Such a proper concept should also address the whole spectrum of operations, both in the horizontal sense (different assets including military capabilities), and in the vertical sense, which concerns the ladder of all stages of escalation and de-escalation.

Concerning our capacities to assess and analyse threats and to predict behaviour or future events, another experience is that too much analysis is driven by our own Western logic – the problem of ‘mirroring’. That is, assuming rational behaviour on the basis of what we would do in a similar situation, rather than taking the opponent’s history, culture, behaviour and statements as a basis. Merely because we believe we are rational or well-intentioned does not make other actors so. In the Cold War, a rational opponent could be relied upon, to a large degree, to act in his own interests. Irrationality on a large scale, on the other hand, has become a feature of contemporary politics and geopolitics, and may include opponents acting suicidally against their own interests, because this would cause greater damage to the West.

There is also a tendency to overestimate our own strength, resulting in a flawed perception that we can decide the course of events in conflicts and their intensity. We need to remember the old experience that the best plan has to be reviewed after the first encounter with the opponent, and that our planning should, at all times, be based on worst-case scenarios.

There is a further tendency to underestimate the duration of conflicts, and the nature of the commitment required. A quick solution is a rare thing. We must be prepared for long com-

mitments – much longer than we would like. Therefore, sustainability is a key issue, not only for the political will of a society, but also for the material assets needed, both military and non-military.

Finally, and probably most importantly, no military intervention will succeed without an effective political–military command structure. This must be based on a clear mandate, observing the principle of unity of command and purpose. International organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) find this difficult to accept, raising structural problems to mandates that originate from international organisations and that require multinational force structures.

Nations have a tendency to impose national caveats on the use of their forces, which can prevent the operational commander from making adequate use of allocated forces. Nations are not willing – and this is still the case in Afghanistan today – to transfer authority to an operational commander at the moment when forces enter the theatre of operations.

Although there is disagreement within NATO about the division of labour between national command and operational command of the multinational force structure, it is our view that the operational commanders should be able to make use of the forces available to them, within the limits set by the politically approved mission.

Achieving this is not without difficulty. It is undeniable that multinationality becomes more and more problematic the lower down the command structure one goes, because of differences in discipline, training standards and weapons systems. Much investment in time, resources and human capital is necessary to make a multinational force structure effective, even if the command level is properly chosen. Common exer-

cises are very important, for example, because they create trust and calibrate standards, rendering operational command easier to achieve. In addition, common war-games, joint acquisitions and the pooling of capabilities and resources are all to be encouraged, because they can strengthen an alliance that today is lacking both unity and capabilities.

Capabilities

Most European nations have inadequate military capabilities, and NATO has no non-military capabilities. Two documents by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *European Defense Integration* and *European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability*, make this abundantly clear.⁷

The latter study – on command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) – concerns the gap between the US and European defence systems. Although European nations have come quite far in integrating command and control (C2) through the NATO framework, none is likely to have a networked military in the foreseeable future. The document further notes that this is not due to absence of technology, but to budgetary constraints. C4ISR remains an area where further transatlantic cooperation is needed; and, to enhance both intra-European and transatlantic interoperability, European allies will have to show greater commitment to making this a policy priority.

The CSIS study on the integration of European defence points

⁷ *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities*, CSIS October 2005; *European C4ISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability*, CSIS October 2004.

out that the gap between the intention, in both the European and NATO security strategies, and European military capabilities continues to widen. The fragmented nature of European defence, constrained budgets and lack of political will have rendered progress slow. To overcome this, the paper proposes defence integration – that is, coordinating the efforts of European countries – and using the EU and NATO to create a set of collective defence capabilities. To this end, greater cooperation between the EU and NATO will be necessary, as will the formulation of more compatible visions of European defence needs and military doctrines; more cooperative research, development and procurement; the pooling of national capabilities; and having several nations specialise in unique capabilities that might lead to high-value contributions.

These two studies provide a wealth of information on both the general capabilities and the shortcomings, right down to very technical details. We endorse their findings and conclusions about European and NATO capabilities, and in this paper we wish to draw particular attention to two aspects of capability: intelligence and sustainability.

Intelligence

Today's military and security challenges have greatly increased the importance of the contribution to be made by intelligence and security services, in terms of both timely and also hard intelligence. In the Cold War, the secret world of intelligence and counter-intelligence had a major impact on strategy, force planning and defence policy. But in those days the threat was regionally focused and allowed the luxury of some warning time. With WMD proliferation and terrorism, nations are insufficiently prepared for far more widely spread and diffuse targets.

The acute requirement for progress against the threat of terrorism since 9/11 has given greater prominence to ‘intelligence’, but it is not always clear whether this implies secret operations or the collection of information and the work of analysts. It seems that improvement is needed on several fronts: principally on open source research analysis and on secret human intelligence operations.

There is one further area that weakens Western intelligence agencies, and that is the lack of cooperation and sharing of important information. On the whole, intelligence sharing continues to be a core question among Western allies, but it remains difficult to implement and requires continuous effort. We note that considerable progress has been made since 9/11, but there is still an important lack of cooperation in intelligence sharing.

Sustaining military operations

The question of sustainability is a major issue, and it applies not only to military factors – like manpower, equipment and logistics – but also to political will and the support of society. Sustainability means the long-term political resolve to stay committed. It also requires a sound industrial backup to support deployments. There is also a need for a fairer distribution of risks and costs, and for increased interoperability and standardisation between allies. Moreover, sustainability will never be achieved if nations continue to regard operations such as those in Afghanistan as a fringe activity, imposing caveats on their national contingents that prove a serious impediment to an efficient operation. The tendency of nations not to resource their operations effectively is aggravated by the intensity and tempo of operations, which leads to a greater need for replacement of equipment than was foreseen. We may say, therefore, that capabilities today are about sustaining

a level of operational intensity that is much greater than it was during the Cold War.

If we consider involvements in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, then it is clear that they require long-term commitments. Sustainability can only be achieved if the defence plans of nations and institutions like NATO take this seriously into account. For example, NATO possesses in total more than 2 million forces and close to a thousand helicopters. Yet we see today that NATO is struggling to sustain manpower in Afghanistan, where 35,500 troops from NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF-NATO) and 5,500 non-NATO troops operate, and have difficulty in finding small numbers of additional transport helicopters.

Common efforts to improve sustainability are important; and common will and political resolve are crucial.

| Conclusion

On balance, there is a great mismatch between the interconnected list of dangers and the international and national capabilities to respond to them – capabilities that are weakened by their disunity. The scale and complexity of the trends, risks, challenges and threats creates an overall picture that extends far beyond military matters. This interlinkage of threats, however, should guide an integrated and allied grand strategy and the capabilities needed.

No institution and no nation is capable of responding to these dangers and risks on its own; and just a cursory glance at our international organisations leads us to ask whether we have a

proper basis for coordinated action. Unfortunately, it would appear that we do not.

What we do have, however, are common aims, values and interests, and these alone provide a sufficient basis on which to design a new global strategy – one that appreciates the complexity and unpredictability, and that links all the instruments and capabilities together. Looking at the scale of trends, challenges and threats, we cannot see a solution in America, Europe, or any individual nation acting alone. What we need is a transatlantic alliance capable of implementing a comprehensive grand strategy that is integrated, both nationally and among allies.

We propose a possible grand strategy in the next chapter.



At the end of Chapter 2 we noted a mismatch between the challenges we face and the institutional capabilities we currently have in place to deal with them. In addition, there is a mismatch between the urgent need to act in order to reduce the potential for crises and conflicts, and the lack of public awareness about the instability that makes such action necessary. This second mismatch has, in a number of Western countries, produced a lack of resolve to address the reasons for conflicts. In other cases it results in a lack of will to see conflicts through, because the political actors believe in the flawed perception that all conflicts can be solved through dialogue and negotiated settlements. There is also, from a slightly different direction, a problem of people who think that military means alone are capable of solving most – if not all – of the problems that the West in general, and the transatlantic alliance in particular, is currently struggling with.

With this in mind, we have come to the conclusion that, at this time, no international organisation – let alone any country – possesses a convincing vision for a more peaceful world, an adequate strategy for how to bring one about, or the credible political will to see crises through (or – better – prevent them). Above all, we observe that players are incapable of acting in a joint and coordinated way.

We concluded above that a comprehensive and global strategy (a ‘grand strategy’) is needed to address the many discrepancies. But that is not the whole story. A strategy is not an end in itself, but rather a means to attain larger aims. In order to attain these aims –and indeed to put a truly comprehensive strategy into action – there must be institutional im-

provement and a significant expansion of capabilities.

Moreover, such a grand strategy will then drive the national strategies, policies and doctrines that serve as a benchmark in attaining the capabilities needed for carrying out a global strategy.

In this chapter, we will first define and delineate what we understand by a global grand strategy – a strategy that is integrated domestically and that is internationally agreed among allies. We will discuss the prerequisites for and elements of such a strategy. We will touch on the relationship between strategy and law. We will address issues such as prevention and pre-emption. And we will ask whether institutions that follow the traditional ‘stove-pipe’ style of thinking and operating are really the right answer to the challenges of our time.

Our aim in this chapter is to offer some ideas for a comprehensive grand strategy that could help governments restore some of the clarity and certainty lost after the end of the Cold War. Without such certainty, societies cannot work. Loss of clarity and certainty leads to a decline in power and ability. We hope that our suggestions might help in the task of preparing international organisations, such as NATO or the EU, for the challenges that lie in our future.

| Prerequisites for a Strategy

Before defining an aim for a grand strategy, we need an anchor point. Our anchor point is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations, agreed by the majority of the world’s nations. This document consti-

tutes a universally agreed and globally applicable set of values and convictions.

Under it, all countries have one ultimate responsibility – to protect the individual human being, as described in the 2001 report *The Responsibility to Protect* by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

This responsibility is at the very core of national sovereignty, and insists to all countries that violations and restrictions of elementary human rights are not a mere internal matter. By the same token, no country that wishes to preserve the credibility of its human rights commitment can turn a blind eye to blatant violations of human rights, let alone to genocide.

Based on this very fundamental conviction, and on the common belief that democracy, the rule of law and good governance constitute values that must be preserved and protected, a group of nations entered into a legally binding commitment of collective defence. This was known as the North Atlantic Treaty, and it established the NATO alliance in 1949. This group of nations grew over time, and today NATO comprises some 26 democratic nations. It is this group of nations that we have in mind as a point of departure – though by no means as an end point – when we propose a common grand strategy. The strategy we present is generic, and could be applied by other organisations as well, and so it is a model not only for NATO.

Each of the organisations we mentioned in Chapter 2 has its shortcomings. NATO likewise has deficiencies, but it does have one major advantage: it links together a group of countries that share the most important values and convictions and that took a decision to defend those values and convictions collectively.

The strategy we present is not supposed to cement any organisation in its present form, and nor is it tailored to implementation by only one organisation or state. But this generic strategy could most effectively apply to NATO as a logical point of departure, and then extend to the EU, and, after that, to other partnerships. It is principally designed for this Western perspective, but is by no means opposed to other strategies.

Our strategy does not aim to impose our values and convictions, nor is it directed against any other country; and it does not exclude any other country, provided it shares the same values and convictions. Other countries and other regional organisations could cooperate on different levels – a vision on concentric circles of partnership that we will elaborate on in Chapter 4.

On the other hand, we are not aware of any other international, supranational or regional organisation in which all members share human rights, the rule of law, good governance and democracy as common values and convictions, and in which all these members are determined to defend themselves and these values by all available means. We therefore take NATO as our organisation of departure, while acknowledging that it must undergo fundamental political change in order to remain the organisation of choice in international security.

Definition of Strategy

If we compare the hypothetical aim and objectives of a comprehensive grand strategy to the classic definition of strategy as given by Carl von Clausewitz, who defined strategy as ‘the theory of the use of combat for the object of war’, then one can quickly conclude that a wider definition is needed. Sir Lawrence

Freedman defined it in a way that comes closer to today's needs, describing strategy as a theory of the application of power, where power is the ability to produce intended effects.

This definition could, however, still be misunderstood as primarily referring to military power. We see strategy as the application of the means to achieve a political objective; and consequently, a grand strategy as the art of using all elements of power (of either a nation or an alliance of nations) to accomplish a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a nation or of an alliance of nations in peace and war. A grand strategy comprises the carefully coordinated and fully integrated use of all political, economic, military, cultural, social, moral, spiritual and psychological power available.

It is important to recognise that a grand strategy can only be formulated after the desired aim and objectives have been determined. The aim, the objectives and the power needed to attain them are the indispensable fundamentals of any strategy.

Once aims and objectives have been determined, all aspects of the problems that confront a nation or an alliance must then be thoroughly analysed, and an evaluation made of the character, size and capabilities of the various elements available, at the national or international level, in order to develop an effective strategy.

Possible courses of action, utilising the elements of power in varying combinations, must then be analysed to develop the best strategy possible, taking into account the opposition that may be encountered as the strategy unfolds. Any strategy ought to be sufficiently flexible to counter unexpected moves by opponents. That is, strategy options should be developed to provide choices for all possible contingencies.

Aims and Objectives

The aims of our strategy are to preserve peace, values, free trade and stability. It seeks as much certainty as possible for the member nations, the resolution of crises by peaceful means and the prevention of armed conflict. In doing so, it aims to reduce the reasons for conflict and – should all attempts to find peaceful solutions fail – to defend the member states' territorial integrity and protect their citizens' way of life, including their values and convictions.

It is a protective and proactive strategy – not a reactive one. And it must be stressed that this strategy aims neither at imposing our order, values and convictions on others, nor at territorial gains or any widening of the member states' sphere of influence. Enforced regime change is not an aim of our strategy.

The objectives of such a grand strategy, aimed at achievable certainty, are therefore threefold:

- Dealing with global challenges through protection against threats, risks and dangers;
- Building security in the allied states' neighbourhoods and their zones of strategic interest;
- Working towards a stable international order through multilateral cooperation.

Principles and Elements

In the days of the Cold War, the world was more or less determined by the Westphalian Order. Strategies could be based on the assumption that the opponents were state actors and would probably apply a similar, if not the same, logical se-

quence in choosing their actions. It is not mere nostalgia to point out that governments then could count on some degree of responsibility from a country and its people. This permitted the use of existential threats as the ultimate tool to achieve a strategy's objectives. Both sides planned for the worst, but could also believe that any opponent would show some respect for what was then customary international law.

None of these certainties exist any longer. A grand strategy for our time must, more than ever before, be prepared for the unexpected. It has to address the reasons for conflict while seeking to eliminate (or at least reduce) them. Of course, it must do so without violating the legal framework set by present-day international law. And at the same time, it has to deal with the complexity of the international environment.

Principles

The first – indeed the basic – principle of any strategy for democratic nations is that the strategy must be protective in both nature and scope. But being protective does not mean being reactive. Thus any strategy must overcome the initial disadvantage of being forced to react by striving to quickly regain – and maintain – the initiative, since whoever possesses the initiative determines the course of action; and whoever determines the course of action can end the conflict on their own terms.

The desire to gain and maintain the initiative must, of course, be reconciled with the necessary principle of proportionality. But proportionality should not be misunderstood: it is not a narrowly defined tit-for-tat approach (which would limit, if not rule out, the option to escalate), but rather a self-imposed restriction, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people in the operation zone. This is a vital instrument in

persuading one-time opponents to cooperate and even become partners after the conflict is over.

Closely linked to proportionality is the principle of damage limitation. This requires looking at actions taken during a crisis or a conflict through the lens of the post-conflict period. The principle gains in importance as military operations are conducted as wars 'among the people'. To achieve this end, damage done in the area of operations must be as small as possible, yet it must not reduce the chances of quick success, scored as decisively as possible. We are therefore no longer preoccupied with the traditional principle of destruction, which dominated strategic thinking from the early 19th century. The new principle – in line with the progress of technology – is the principle of minimum damage and victory through paralysis, involving the surgical use of all available instruments of power.

Simultaneously observing proportionality and damage limitation will become extremely difficult in cases where the use of nuclear weapons must be considered. The first use of nuclear weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly existential dangers. At first glance, it may appear disproportionate; but taking account of the damage that it might prevent, it could well be proportionate. Despite the immense power of destruction possessed by nuclear weapons, the principle of damage limitation remains valid and must be kept in mind. Indeed, it was one of the principles that governed NATO's nuclear planning during the Cold War.

Another principle is legality. All action must be legitimate, properly authorised and in general accordance with customary international law. This is a grave impediment in combating

opponents who show not the slightest respect for any law; but acting differently would, in the end, mean applying the law of the jungle and eroding our own credibility. This principle does not, however, rule out the necessary adaptation of existing international law to the changing international environment, since no legal culture – national or international – is ever static. This concerns *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and the authorisation to use force.

Finally, the resolve to sustain an action is a fundamental principle of a modern strategy. Whatever instruments are used, there is always a need to see the effort through, until the aim and the objectives are achieved. This requires, first and foremost, the political will to act, the patience and the stamina to see it through, and the manifold resources needed to sustain efforts that may go on for decades. Resolve, however, must never mean obstinacy. The will to see a crisis or a conflict through always requires the flexibility to adapt actions as appropriate, in order to achieve the strategic aim.

Elements

One truly indispensable element of any strategy in the 21st century is deterrence. This will no longer be deterrence by punishment, nor the threat of total destruction, which served us so well in preserving peace during the Cold War.

In the Post-Westphalian world, and against non-state actors, such deterrence does not work. What is needed is a new deterrence, which conveys a single, unambiguous message to all enemies: *There is not, and never will be, any place where you can feel safe; a relentless effort will be made to pursue you and deny you any options you might develop to inflict damage upon us.*

Deterrence in our time thus still avails itself of creating uncertainty in the opponent's mind – no longer reactively but proactively. What is needed is a policy of deterrence by proactive denial, in which pre-emption is a form of reaction when a threat is imminent, and prevention is the attempt to regain the initiative in order to end the conflict.

As deterrence might occasionally either be lost or fail, the ability to restore deterrence through escalation at any time is another element of a proactive strategy.

Escalation is intimately linked to the option of using an instrument first. A strategy that views escalation as an element can, therefore, neither rule out first use nor regard escalation as pre-programmed and inevitable. Escalation and de-escalation must be applied flexibly. Escalation is thus no longer a ladder on which one steps from rung to rung; it is much more a continuum of actions, as though there is a 'trampoline' that permits the action to be propelled up into the sky at one moment and just to stand still the next.

Such a concept of interactive escalation requires escalation dominance, the use of a full bag of both carrots and sticks – and indeed all instruments of soft and hard power, ranging from the diplomatic protest to nuclear weapons. As flexible escalation and de-escalation are the crucial instruments in gaining and maintaining the initiative, fast decision making is of the essence. The traditional forms and methods of governments and international organisations will today (in a world of instantaneous global communications) no longer be capable of meeting this requirement. Thus a thorough review and adaptation is required.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric response – and at the same time the ultimate tool of esca-

lation. Yet they are also more than an instrument, since they transform the nature of any conflict and widen its scope from the regional to the global. Regrettably, nuclear weapons – and with them the option of first use – are indispensable, since there is simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world. On the contrary, the risk of further proliferation is imminent and, with it, the danger that nuclear war fighting, albeit limited in scope, might become possible. This development must be prevented. It should therefore be kept in mind that technology could produce options that go beyond the traditional role of nuclear weapons in preventing a nuclear armed opponent from using nuclear weapons. In sum, nuclear weapons remain indispensable, and nuclear escalation continues to remain an element of any modern strategy.

Asymmetry will be used by all conflict parties, which means both that our side must be more prepared for the unexpected than ever before, and that the opponent must never know how, where or when we will act. To act asymmetrically could well be an instrument in regaining the initiative and could require deployment of the full range of options, from diplomacy to military intervention. Nuclear escalation is the ultimate step in responding asymmetrically, and at the same time the most powerful way of inducing uncertainty in an opponent's mind.

It is important, furthermore, to have dominance over the opponent's ability to calculate his risks. It is a very important element of strategy to keep things unpredictable for the opponent, who must never be able to know, or calculate, what action we will take. It is essential to maintain this dimension of psychological warfare by instilling fear in an opponent, to retain an element of surprise and thus deny him the opportunity of calculating the risk.

To that end, the strategy and strategy options need to be flexible, both in terms of a wide spectrum of types of response, and in terms of being able to apply different rungs on the ladder of escalation and violence. The more flexible the use that is made of response options, the greater the uncertainty that can be created in an opponent.

Unpredictability is an important element of any strategy that aims at conflict prevention and termination. Opponents must never know which step could be the next one, and must never have a chance to rule out any of the options in their opponent's arsenal. Thus the employment of military force, although the *ultimate* resort of politics, is not its last resort. Carl von Clausewitz used the word *äußerst*, or *utmost*, to describe the role of military force, but that never meant *last resort over time*. This *ultima ratio* of politics might very well be the first option to be used.

The early use of military responses is often linked to pre-emption and prevention – both elements of modern strategy. Both are applicable throughout a crisis or conflict, and neither is necessarily linked to a specific set of instruments, such as the military.

Pre-emption is the reactive response, when an opponent's action is considered imminent; whereas prevention is a proactive step aimed at denial – and thus at conflict termination – in a situation in which the threat is not yet imminent, but in which evidence indisputably points to the unavailability of conflict. Pre-emption is widely seen as a legal act of self-defence under customary international law, whereas the question of the legality of a preventive use of force so far remains unanswered.

In a world that is interconnected by real-time global commu-

nications, every step must be accompanied by a carefully orchestrated and well coordinated media campaign, in which it will again be vital to win and maintain the initiative. A modern grand strategy must include a media strategy aimed at winning the hearts and minds of people around the world. It must ensure information dominance, and thus guarantee the credibility of the action. It ought to be a 'first strike' media strategy, aimed at hitting the headlines first, though never at the expense of the truth.

| Our Proposal for a New Strategy

The Basis: Security at Home

To be prepared for a strategy that includes the option of early decisive action requires the nation, economy, order of life, territory and vulnerable infrastructure to be well protected at all times. The defence (or better, protection, since response today to current risks cannot be military alone) of the country or the alliance is no longer an objective in a modern grand strategy, but rather its basis. It is a truly indispensable prerequisite of the strategy's implementation. Without credible protection at home, the public's support for actions elsewhere – in particular, for expeditionary operations ranging from aid programmes to armed intervention – fades quickly.

Protection means taking all necessary reactive steps, including setting up missile defence and cyber protection, to prevent an enemy inflicting damage on the nation or alliance; minimising the damage if prevention fails; and restoring the nation's or alliance's integrity. Such protection can no longer be

achieved with responsibilities split between homeland security and defence against an attack from the outside, since the opposition could be non-state actors as well as state actors, or be a combination of the two, and an attack is not necessarily a military attack. Protection should seek prevention of any attack, and therefore protection begins with proactive intelligence – at home and abroad – which must be properly ‘fused’ and must avail itself of all sources.

Living in a world in which the enemy might live among us, we must not yield to the considerable temptation to give up legal restrictions and impose limits on citizens’ rights – something that would erode support for the state and its government. Adequate protection today is not possible if our governments fail to win the hearts and minds of their own people. Therefore, any restriction on individual liberties and citizens’ rights must be treated with the utmost caution. The continuing threat posed by terrorism and organised international crime requires restrictions on individual liberties, but these restrictions must never erode the citizens’ resolve to protect their country at all costs. On the other hand, homeland security must use all the options and instruments at its disposal to detect and prevent an opponent’s attempts to inflict damage on our vulnerable societies.

But there is a proactive side to protection as well, and that is to meet the threats wherever they emerge. Again, proactive protection encompasses much more than military means, and it aims to keep risks at bay. Simultaneously, the combination of a credible reactive and proactive protection will have a deterrent effect on all potential attackers, state or non-state, provided the country or alliance uses its expeditionary capability, which conveys the credible message that no attacker can find any safe haven on earth.

Based on credible and efficient protection, and founded on convincing policies that do not aim at suppression or at a widening of spheres of influence, one can confidently turn outward and pursue proactive conflict reduction policies as a first – and, in principle, non-military – phase of strategy.

However, before implementation begins, one truly fundamental principle must be grasped. It ought to be broadly and enduringly accepted by the public and unwaveringly supported by the politicians of the nation or alliance: proactive prevention is inextricably linked to preparedness and determination to see the action through. Once that is understood, there are four phases of strategy application and implementation.

Phases of Strategy Application and Implementation

With the aims and the objectives of the proposed grand strategy clearly spelt out, the only thing left to do is agree on the political purpose in a crisis or conflict and make sure the strategy squares with the political objective of the desired end. This first truly critical political decision will determine the scope and sequence of actions and the initial allocation of means and resources. The phases of implementation ought not to be seen in a binding sequence. One must tailor the actions according to the aim and objectives. Unless a nation or an alliance comes under attack (which would automatically lead to all necessary steps of self-defence), tensions, crises and conflicts will always begin with an attempt to settle the situation peacefully, finding ways of eliminating or reducing the reasons for conflict. Following that initial step, there is no longer any prescribed sequence, and the phases of strategy implementation will be applied or repeated – depending on the circumstances – in an escalatory or de-escalatory way.

Therefore, at the beginning of a crisis, a comprehensive concept comprising all phases of strategy implementation must be developed. These phases include the preventive strategy of reducing the causes of conflict, proactive crisis management, enforcement and post-intervention stabilisation.

Reducing the causes of conflict

Hypothetically, all steps taken during this first phase of strategy implementation will aim at non-coercive elimination of the reasons that have led to tensions, crisis or conflict. Such steps may aim at the reduction of poverty, the resolution of disputes over resources, including water or energy, the settlement of territorial or ethnic claims, mitigation of effects induced by climate change, the termination of violations of human rights, etc. The instruments available are persuasive diplomacy (including defence diplomacy), negotiations, and economic, social, educational, political and possibly security assistance (including the reduction or termination of protectionism or the prospect of membership of international organisations). The purpose will often be the establishment of good governance, free and just trade (including free and peaceful access to critical resources) and economic development and assistance, as requested, in establishing a well functioning state.

During this first phase, free societies must avail themselves of the most powerful weapon in their inventory: the attraction of a free society, in which the individual enjoys human rights, the rule of law, a free market economy that permits the pursuit of happiness, and a certainty that allows the society to flourish. The attraction of such a society, its openness, the patience and long-term vision of its leaders, plus the credible resolve to defend these traits, are the tools that brought the Cold War to an end on our terms and that made Communism

fail. Although history will never repeat itself, this lesson must not be forgotten. The instrument can still be used in today's world, but it should never be imposed on anyone, since change must come from within a society.

The initial step in implementing the proposed strategy of preventive protection could be particularly effective in dealing with non-state actors, since over time it will erode their support base, and thus increasingly limit their freedom of operations. In conjunction with protection of the indigenous population and the concomitant build-up of democratically controlled military and police forces, and of a non-corrupt judiciary, terrorism and organised crime could just fade away.

The proactive reduction of conflict potential could help to achieve any or all of the objectives of the proposed grand strategy. Eventually, if so desired by the nation or nations involved, countries that are of some concern could thus mature and even become members of international organisations such as NATO, the EU or some new forms of effective multilateralism.

Proactive crisis management

Should all attempts to reduce the potential for conflict fail, then proactive crisis management will commence. Its purpose is to avoid an armed conflict, to defuse the crisis (or at least to contain it) and to return to the reduction of conflict potential.

Nevertheless, planning for an armed intervention should begin during this phase of strategy implementation. Such planning has to be comprehensive, and should fully integrate all the instruments of politics, including all the available military means. It must also take account of all factors that character-

ise and impact on the potential theatre of operations – such as history, culture, religion or ethnic issues. Thus the planner will seek to assess in advance the repercussions of an intervention, in terms of regional stability and beyond.

Planning of an armed intervention must begin with political agreement on the desired political end, on the objective of the intervention and the ensuing post-intervention stabilisation. This first step of planning has to be followed by the development of a matching Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the associated rules of engagement (ROE). Following the political approval of the CONOPS and the ROE, one could start, interrupt and restart the provisional force-generation process, thus underpinning the political resolve to escalate or de-escalate, while demonstrating credibility and reducing the time needed to launch an intervention.

These steps must be accompanied by well coordinated and proactive media efforts, which could help achieve the objectives without recourse to intervention. At the same time, such media efforts might help to pave the way for the hearts and minds campaign, which must accompany any armed intervention.

The instruments of this phase range from all forms of coercive diplomacy, including sanctions (in particular targeted sanctions), through the forging of ad hoc coalitions, to ultimatums and the threat of force.

During this second phase of strategy implementation, the involvement of the UN might become necessary, as the UN is, at this time, the only body that can legalise coercive measures to be taken against another state, which could itself be the opposition or else could be harbouring hostile non-state actors (whether at its own invitation or because the state is a failing state no longer capable of executing its powers). UN legalisa-

tion may not be necessary under Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defence) and it may be possible to renounce it under the Genocide Convention.

All steps of proactive crisis management must be accompanied by unstinting efforts to ensure and improve protection of the nation/alliance and simultaneous efforts at potential conflict reduction. It is the integrated, coordinated and indeed intertwined use of all instruments short of the use of force that promises success. To this end, it is essential never to rule out any hypothetical option that includes the use of force, and to pursue a proactive media campaign, which trumpets a simple message: the firm and unwavering resolve to see the crisis through and to prevail.

It should be noted that, in today's interconnected world, the opposition will be closely following all debates in the country or alliance as it tries to find a solution. Thus all public debates, necessary as they are in democracies, must take account of this undesired side effect, as they could well provide encouragement for the opposition to drive a wedge into a nation's or an alliance's cohesion. Domestic debates could easily increase the danger of terrorist attack – a powerful instrument of asymmetric response aimed at weakening a nation's or alliance's resolve to see the action through.

To this end, it should be kept in mind that the proactive protection of the homeland can serve as a real deterrent, and is one of the principles of deterrence that must never be neglected: deterrence requires maintaining uncertainty in the opponent's mind as to what the next step might be. This means, in today's world, that no opponent must ever feel safe anywhere, and thus one must be prepared to meet the risks, dangers and threats wherever they emerge, and to intervene if that is unavoidable.

Enforcement

Should all non-coercive instruments be exhausted, and no other option be left open, enforcement operations need to be considered, agreed upon and then acted upon. Enforcement should only be employed when all non-coercive instruments hold out no promise of success. This could be a long-drawn-out process. Once agreed upon, enforcement should be conducted with the aim of returning to diplomacy as quickly as possible.

Enforcement operations can therefore only be considered if there is a legitimate case for using this ultimate instrument, if there is the political will to sustain the effort, and if both the resources and the capabilities needed are available. Though enforcement will be the exception rather than the rule, the option of enforcement must remain an instrument in the toolbox of crisis management. Its use cannot be ruled out in any phase of crisis management.

Most democratic nations will consider enforcement as politically acceptable if:

- no other option is left to achieve the agreed political objective, because the crucial interests of a nation or an alliance are at stake;
- an attack is imminent or has taken place by state or non-state actors launched from the country or region in which enforcement will be conducted;
- no other option exists to prevent or terminate genocide.

Enforcement operations are not necessarily military operations. In cases in which unambiguous intelligence suggests that a military action by an opponent is imminent, pre-emptive military action might be the appropriate act of reactive

self-defence. It could well be that preventive action has to be considered, too – that is, an action in response to an opponent's activities that lack imminence but that suggest a conflict is unavoidable. The danger of genocide could serve as an example.

In such a situation (for instance Rwanda in 1994) preventive military action could indeed be the least harmful and most appropriate option; although, however legitimate it may be, the legalisation of such an action by the UN is not very likely. Similarly, however probable it may be that a state is about to acquire WMD, this is unlikely to lead to UN authorisation for a preventive military operation. There would be serious doubts about the legality of such action, unless it could be proven that the action was being taken in self-defence.

These examples raise the question of recourse in the case of the UN Security Council being deadlocked. Obviously, action taken by an individual state or group of states might be the answer, as it was in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign: that was widely seen as being legitimate, although questions remained as to whether it was entirely legal. Though no satisfactory answer can be given at this time, it should be noted that international law is not merely codified law, but is also customary law, which is shaped by actions taken and unwritten standards of interpretation and legitimacy. It should be further noted that a process set in motion in 2001 – when, in a document produced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the idea of national sovereignty was connected to the state's responsibility to protect the individual. This prevents tyranny from hiding behind the curtain of national sovereignty, and, in case of major abuses, a state can forfeit its national sovereignty to the international community. This principle was included in the UN World Summit Outcome of 2005 and

accepted by the General Assembly without a vote.⁸

Enforcement operations may begin with measures short of military intervention, such as enforced embargoes, blockades, declaration of no-flight zones and maritime exclusion zones, but also restrictions or blockades of communications, traffic, trade, currency exchange and the proactive use of cyber operations. All may be suitable means of enforcing an end to a conflict.

Cyber operations will probably gain in prominence as technology advances in the coming decades. It might well become feasible to paralyse a country and to disrupt all the options an opposing government has to employ its instruments of power and control the country. Should this option become operational, we might see the advent of a strategy of 'paralysation', which might then replace traditional enforcement with the much more subtle means of cyber attack.

For the time being, however, the ultimate form of enforcement is military intervention. This could end up with neutralisation or destruction of the military power of an opponent and the ensuing temporary occupation of one or more countries, followed by the establishment of a transitional administration in the region.

Throughout enforcement, all steps and measures of the preceding implementation phases must continue to be applied, so that enforcement will not be a step taken in isolation. In

8 The difference between the ICISS document and paragraphs 138 and 139 of General Assembly (GA) Resolution 60/1 (2005) is that the ICISS document leaves the door open to unilateralism based on clearly defined Just War criteria, whereas the GA Resolution leaves the final word with the Security Council. Nonetheless, for the GA to accept the idea of connecting national sovereignty to the protection of the individual is a conceptual breakthrough in international law.

parallel with enforcement, or immediately following the termination of operations, constabulary forces have to take over. These constabulary forces, which blend the role of the military, police, judiciary and public administration, are a crucial element for post-intervention stabilisation.

They must ensure a secure environment, and they must take control of the country's administration, policing and judicial system, its border control and protection until either an international transitional authority can take over, or an indigenous authority leads the way to self-sustained stability, and with it the withdrawal of foreign forces.

Post-intervention stabilisation

Post-intervention stabilisation is the implementation element that ends a conflict politically, through the restoration or establishment of good governance, the rule of law and economic as well as democratic build-up.

It is the most complex and time- and resource-consuming phase in the implementation of the strategy. It requires patience, stamina, considerable resources, a good deal of altruistic idealism – and the iron will to see the mission through to success. Nations or alliances that are not prepared to go down the very long and often bumpy road to success would do better to refrain from intervention, rather than run the risk of creating instability where stability was the objective.

Post-intervention stabilisation must never be misunderstood as rebuilding or reconstruction alone: it should include all the instruments of our strategy. A closely coordinated and integrated set of measures in the political, economic and social domain is needed, and governments, institutions, NGOs, private investors and enterprises have to bring their respective

instruments to rebuild a country or a zone of intervention without imposing a form of life or of governance on the people against their will, values and heritage. Respect for a nation's heritage should never compromise the basics of human rights and the rule of law.

Post-intervention stabilisation comes to an end when self-sustained stability and good governance is achieved and all foreign elements are withdrawn.

| Consequences

The four phases of strategy implementation outlined constitute a continuum of intertwined, interconnected, integrated and coordinated actions focused on achieving the aims and objectives of a strategy of preventive protection.

This strategy can achieve the protection of all member states, although protection will never mean 100 per cent assurance that no damage can be inflicted on a member. But the combination of protection at home and the elimination – or at least reduction – of risks abroad, plus the efforts of building security in the neighbourhood and in the zones of strategic interest, offers our nations the chance of a future of peace and stability at affordable cost and tolerable risk.

It is a strategy that aims at security of likeminded nations (or of an alliance of such nations), but that has no intention of making these nations the world's policemen. In implementing the strategy, nations and alliances will strive for cooperation with regional organisations. As with all strategies throughout history, our strategy is nothing but a concept, which must be adapted to the opposition's actions/reactions as implementa-

tion begins – that is, to the given situation in the real world. But the more complex the world is, the better it is to have a concept, within which one can develop options for success when it comes to ending a conflict on one's own terms.

Such a strategy alone – even if it were eventually accepted by all governments – will achieve nothing if there is not the political will to see a crisis through and the resolve to adapt international organisations (notably NATO and the EU), and if there are not matching capabilities to implement the strategy. In this respect, we see serious shortfalls and deficiencies.

Leaving aside at this time the question of how to generate political will on both sides of the Atlantic, the consequences of implementing such a strategy will concern three areas: actors, procedures and capabilities.

As has been mentioned repeatedly, the actors have to be international organisations, since no nation state is any longer able to cope with the complexity of the international environment. At the same time, there is no international organisation that commands all the instruments of politics, is global in outlook and is able to project power in all categories of political action beyond the scope of its own region. Thus, a review of existing arrangements and the adaptation or change of organisations such as NATO and the EU would appear to be the first consequence of the adoption of a grand strategy for peace and stability in our time.

It follows from this that the procedures for decision making need to be changed.

The most important prerequisite for good decision making is sound, reliable and corroborated intelligence. Change in the ways and methods of how intelligence is gathered, fused and

assessed is vital, because, as well as an awareness of the capabilities of opponents, what is needed is sound knowledge of their probable intentions. But intelligence alone only provides a basis – a point of departure. What we also need are decision-making procedures that are synchronised, coordinated among all parties concerned, and then consolidated. In addition, the repeatedly stressed necessity of gaining and maintaining the initiative means that time is of the essence. The extant, often cumbersome, bottom-up decision-making procedures of the existing organisations are not capable of coping with the present challenges.

Finally, we need capabilities that match the aim, objectives and purposes of the proposed grand strategy. We need a full tool-box of instruments, ranging from diplomatic through economic/financial to military capabilities. To fill such a tool-box properly may require us to look more closely at multinational arrangements, even though this could lead to a partial transfer of national sovereignty to international bodies.

Options for change in these three categories will be discussed in the following chapter.

In discussing ideas for the implementation of our proposed grand strategy of preventive protection, we wish to indicate how one might pave the way to a more secure world and a renewed transatlantic partnership. We do so since we believe that the first step in generating the necessary political resolve to develop such a grand strategy is to prove that our proposal is feasible, affordable and manageable. To this end the title of Chapter 4 is ‘An agenda for change’.



An Agenda for Change

CHAPTER
4

TOWARDS A GRAND STRATEGY
FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

Strategic Outlook

Throughout this paper, we have said that none of the existing organisations, nor any nation acting alone, will be capable of coping with the challenges of an unpredictable future. But we have also stressed the need to maintain security and to work towards the restoration of an achievable degree of certainty, without which no society can flourish.

It is not the norm for nations to deal with each other in the highly structured way that has predominated since the two world wars. Having acknowledged this, we also recognise that this is a truly unnerving thought, particularly for Europeans, because it suggests that the 20th century concept of international rule of law could fall victim to a new sort of power politics. An important task for the years to come will, therefore, either be to ensure that existing organisations are strengthened or – should this not be possible – at least to make sure that the weakening of the international structures one can see today will not lead to a new sort of power-driven, and hence often amoral, politics.

This poses a severe problem. With multiple new centres of power, with the often ideological nature of international discourse today, and with the continuous resort to unbridled violence, the world has become unruly, unjust and increasingly violent. In the Western world, our values-based system still holds sway; but even here there are doubts about the fu-

ture, and it is still far from clear how it should adjust to a globalised world. Meanwhile, new challenges, such as terrorism, immigration, demography, the environment and globalisation, are straining our unity. It would be a dramatic mistake not to act now to seek a new order and save as much as possible of the international order – an order that is based on good governance and democratic rule, and in which the rule of law prevails.

This leads to five general conclusions.

First, whatever the future may bring, it is essential that the West redefines itself and its role in the world. A first step would be to mentally adjust the map we all carry in our heads. We should no longer talk about two pillars, Europe and America, deepening cooperation between one another. Enlargement of NATO and the EU has created a common democratic space, which runs from Finland to Alaska. Building this space into a community with a sense of purpose in the world is both our most urgent and our long-term task.

Second, governments are rapidly losing control of events. The process of ‘open sourcing’ of international action is irreversible. None of the actors – be they government, business or NGOs – seem to have a comprehensive view of what is going on. They are fragmented and incapable of acting in a coordinated way towards a common vision. A redefinition of the terms of international discourse would be an essential first step on the long road towards building a community – if not an alliance – of the democratic nations. Perhaps the most important element of this endeavour will be to reshuffle the roles of actors.

Third, existing international structures must adapt to meet new needs. Most international organisations are slow to do this; and, in a world of private capital, some, such as the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are playing a steadily decreasing role. There is no adequately functioning international security organisation, and international organisations such as the EU do not yet fully appreciate that they must embrace the security domain as well. Meanwhile, outside the Euro-Atlantic zone, private militias are determining the course of events in many parts of the world. Nuclear proliferation is a growing danger, and international organised crime and terrorism may well seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, neither the state monopoly on the use of force, nor the established rules of humane behaviour are being adhered to.

Fourth, focusing on the traditional instruments of security no longer suffices. What is needed are international organisations that have all the instruments of politics at their disposal – or that are able to gain access to them, through cooperation with organisations that can compensate for their shortcomings. Unfortunately, neither suitable organisations nor suitable arrangements for cooperation exist at this time.

Fifth, as in every period of rapid and fundamental change, there is no guarantee that the Western nations will emerge as winners if they simply ‘let things happen’. Therefore they must act now, and do so with urgency, to prevent political extremism and nationalism from again haunting the Western world.

These five conclusions, preliminary and incomplete as they are, could fuel years of debate that would be useless if it were not defined by a common vision. With such a vision in mind, a step-by-step approach must be taken to achieve the long-term objective of a zone of restored certainty.

In Chapter 3 we proposed a grand strategy for transatlantic security. In this chapter, we will take this a step further, by

spelling out what should be done to get the existing organisations ready for the strategy's implementation. We will also look at the follow-on step, a roadmap of how to arrive at the new transatlantic bargain, which a community of common security and responsibility will desperately need.

How to Manage Change

Having laid out the long-term vision, challenges and strategy in the earlier parts of this paper, we will now address the changes we believe should be implemented.

The reader might conclude from what has been said so far that we are recommending a completely new set-up, or arguing that such a set-up is now impossible to avoid. But that is not so, and we would very strongly counsel against abandonment of what has worked well. For this reason, we have opted for a pragmatic approach.

But what has worked well must be helped to work better. There is not time – with the threats currently faced – to start again from scratch, and we strongly advise against doing so. We cannot afford to design an entirely new, all-encompassing political architecture – a new grand bargain between the transatlantic partners – and then work towards its implementation. This would be to play with the security of our nations. Living in a situation of uncertainty and being confronted with a host of multi-faceted and multi-dimensional risks and dangers, we must be prepared to react to the unexpected at very short notice and, at the same time, to work hard to prevent the emergence of new confrontations. In such a situation, there is no alternative to keeping what is most important and efficient, building on what we have, and preserving those things that are indispensable.

As examples of what already works, we would cite first and foremost the NATO Article 5 obligation to defend collectively. This is not only a moral imperative, but it has also proved of great practical benefit. We also see, as an example of what already works, the wider Western European Union (WEU) treaty's binding commitment incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty, by which, in the case of attack, EU members are bound to support each other militarily.

These two examples of what is worth preserving at all costs also, however, point to part of the problem. The lack of cooperation – indeed, at times, the rivalry – between the EU and NATO is something that must be rectified. Though these institutions are, at times, weak and betray shortcomings, we still believe that, for the most practical of reasons, it is useful to build on them, not to abandon them.

NATO, the EU and other existing organisations should be refined, not suppressed. If these institutions were able to work together better, then we would have a very significant base from which to work. Of course, central to the refining of those institutions is the part played in the process by America. The USA remains Europe's most important, closest and indispensable ally.

For the USA to play its role as effectively as possible, the transatlantic bargain between the European countries, Canada and their American ally must be renewed. All of America's European allies acknowledge that their relationship with the USA is indispensable. But in order to convince the US to enter into a renewed bargain, Europe needs, in return, to become a truly indispensable partner to the US.

There is a heavy onus on the Europeans to prove their worth here, not least in improving their own capabilities. If they do

not do so, then there is no incentive for America to enter into such a bargain. To bring about renewal, Europe will have to pay the price of enhancing its capabilities. Once that is under way, then the transatlantic partners can agree on a better balance in sharing decision making and carrying the burden of implementation.

Hence, the first step in managing change is to guarantee security for the period of change. To this end, our agenda for change begins with a set of proposals for the organisations that already exist in the area of influence from Finland to Alaska.

In parallel with these steps, which should enhance the resolve of allied nations to act collectively and which should produce improved capabilities, the allies should discuss, and eventually decide on, a new grand strategy for transatlantic security. Our proposal in Chapter 3 could serve as the starting point for such a process, which could – and possibly should – take place simultaneously in NATO and the EU.

Having thus established a solid foundation, the move towards real management of change can begin. First and foremost, this will require a forum in which most allied nations are represented. Such a forum should not be limited to discussion of one set of tools (e.g. the military), but it should be small and effective enough to achieve quick progress. We will propose one possible solution at the end of this chapter.

| An Agenda for Change

|n proposing changes at the various levels of international cooperation, we do not wish to be prescriptive, and nor do we pretend to be exhaustive. Experiences gained during the

turbulent years of crises in Europe in the 1990s taught us that each operation and each crisis requires its own script. But experience has also left other lessons deeply ingrained in our memories: foremost is the urgent and irrefutable need to overcome the rivalry for power between the various international organisations.

Our agenda for change is driven by two motives. First, we want to improve the Western world's ability to cope with the volatile situation in which our countries live. And secondly, each of the steps we propose could bring us closer to our vision – a zone of common interests and shared responsibilities. But we reiterate that this zone should not be seen as being directed against anyone. It will remain open to all who share our values and convictions, expressed by human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance, as well as to those who are able and willing to contribute to our aim of preserving our way of life, peace and stability.

United Nations

As we wish to guarantee maximum security for our nations and also know that security has a global dimension, our first proposal is to call on all the nations of the Western world to renew their efforts to achieve reform of the UN. Proposals for this are on the table.

The UN must ensure that it is the rule of law that prevails, and not the power of force. We recognise that the UN is the only body or organisation capable of authorising the use of force in cases other than immediate self-defence. We wish to strengthen this role, but we also state that, in addition to the obvious case of self-defence in the absence of a UN Security Council (UNSC) authorisation, we regard the use of force as

being legitimate if there is no time to get the UNSC involved, or if the UNSC proves incapable of reaching a decision at a time when immediate action is required to protect large numbers of human beings. Should such extreme and exceptional situations occur, UN authorisation ought to be obtained after initial operations begin.

The fact that we are aware of the UN's shortcomings and deficiencies and believe there are no remedies for those problems in the short to medium term does not, however, mean we do not think that the UN can play a role. We keenly acknowledge that the UN plays – and will continue to play – a significant, indeed often primary, role in the arena of post-intervention stabilisation. The UN has had some notable successes in this area in the recent past, and we hope it can remain engaged, in order to repeat such successes. For this to happen, it is vital that the UN conducts its operations in a better organised manner. It merely serves to hamper matters when non-participant nations have a deciding say in an operation that they are willing to talk about but not to engage in. We therefore propose that decisions on the conduct of an operation should be reserved for those who contribute to the mission. The decision to launch an operation will remain with the Security Council.

UN Security Council authorisation is also mandatory for all post-intervention stabilisation operations. Simultaneously, it should designate a lead organisation or a lead nation to direct subordinate UN bodies, such as the UNHCR, the IAEA, the FAO and others, to cooperate in the theatre of operations. We therefore propose that the UN should arrange for a 'unity of command' in all post-intervention operations.

Finally, in order to reduce rivalries and enhance cooperation, we suggest the establishment and exchange of permanent li-

aisson teams between the UN and major international organisations, such as NATO, the African Union, the EU, ASEAN and the OSCE, and the introduction of regular situation briefings of the UNSC by these regional organisations.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The OSCE is to be seen as a regional organisation in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Its decisive advantage is that it comprises all nations from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It can thus play a vital role in building and furthering confidence between the countries that belong to NATO and the EU, as well as Russia and other countries that do not belong to either of those international organisations. The OSCE is thus a truly important instrument, which can help prevent conflicts in their very early phases. Its role as a mediator should, therefore, be strengthened by further improvements in its decision-making mechanisms, and its ability to apply instruments such as sanctions should be enhanced. To this end, its ability to act in crises that are triggered by economic issues should be improved.

Another important role for the OSCE lies in post-intervention stabilisation and nation building. Therefore, it should be considered whether the OSCE, acting under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as a regional organisation, should not establish stand-by components for judiciary and other administrative functions, which could be made available to the UN or to a UN-authorized lead organisation for post-intervention stabilisation. In addition, the OSCE could, under such auspices, play an important role as a sort of coordinating agent for NGOs, which are, not infrequently, exceedingly reluctant to cooperate with those who might be seen as 'hard power' elements.

Finally, a step worth considering is the arranging of regular situation briefings at OSCE summit meetings by organisations such as NATO, the EU or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The sum of these steps would enhance the OSCE's ability to serve as an early-warning system for crises in the OSCE area of responsibility, and it could improve cooperation between the OSCE and other international organisations in post-intervention stabilisation operations.

| North Atlantic Treaty Organization

We see NATO as an organisation of particular importance, since it is the only organisation that commits the US and Europe, in a legally and mutually binding way, to defend each other collectively. NATO is a political organisation that can deploy military means. Today's NATO is in the process of military transformation, and it has seen some political adaptation. But at its core, the political organisation is, to a large degree, still a Cold War organisation. The cumbersome political structure does not reflect how much the world has changed. It is little suited to the swift political–military requirements of the present era, and it simply cannot take advantage of transformed military capabilities, which would enable the alliance to respond at short notice and conduct operations at a high operational tempo. Today, rapid response is of the essence. Therefore the outdated and weighty stove-pipe systems of specified committees and bottom-up reporting structures need to be seriously reconsidered. As NATO is heavily involved in operations, we feel it is appropriate to differentiate in our agenda for change

between immediate, medium-term and long-term steps.

The Immediate Agenda

In our opinion, the NATO political structure is crying out for review, adaptation and restructuring. At the core is restructuring of the decision-making process. The process that exists within NATO needs a radical overhaul. NATO needs to take political decisions jointly, i.e. based on a unanimous vote of all its members. It is not only for political but also for military reasons that such unity is required. This applies to decisions taken at the NATO Council level, but there is no need for unanimous decisions at all subordinate levels as well. If there are occasions on which allies disagree, the reasons for disagreement will, in the end, always be political in nature. The reasons should, therefore, be brought as expeditiously as possible to the attention of the one and only body that can take political decisions in NATO – the NATO Council.

We therefore propose, as the first step in our agenda for change, that NATO should abandon the consensus principle at all levels below the NATO Council, and introduce at the committee and working-group levels a majority voting rule. This would enable NATO to take quick decisions in crises, when minutes matter.

A NATO Council decision has never constituted a binding obligation to commit forces or to contribute militarily. It has always been left to individual nations to contribute what capabilities or forces they can. But nations that do not contribute forces should also not have a say in the conduct of military operations. We therefore propose, as a second change, that only those nations that contribute to a mission – that is, military forces in a military operation – should have the right to a say in the process of the operation. This structure would

highlight the need and the opportunity for commitment, and commitment would be rewarded at the table. Those who do not commit forces must, of course, be kept informed; but they would have no role to play, so long as the operation unfolds as politically authorised.

The next urgent step aims at improving NATO's intelligence capabilities. It is our impression that, despite many improvements in recent years, too many of NATO's current intelligence arrangements are still driven by Cold War procedures, in which NATO had some warning time and sufficient capabilities to detect the Warsaw Pact's activities. Today, time is of the essence, and a threat may arise entirely unexpectedly, from any direction, surprising in both nature and scope. The existing intelligence provisions are not good enough. We therefore propose, as our step number three, a full-fledged review of NATO's intelligence.

The next change we suggest in order to enhance NATO's capabilities is the abolition of the system of national caveats, as far as this is possible. The system of national caveats has proved to be a major impediment to operations in the past and a major cost-driving factor. That said, we are well aware that the removal of *all* national caveats is an impossibility, requiring sovereignty to be voluntarily ceded; and this nations may not be willing to do.

Operational command

The three levels of command are Full Command, Operational Command and Operational Control. Full command includes full responsibility for the soldier, including recruitment, training, outfitting, but also personnel management. Operational command is the delegation of command within a particular theatre of operations. And operational control is the delegation

of command in a theatre of operations for a specific mission.

While full command is an important element of national sovereignty, and should be left with nations, it is our view that NATO currently needs more operational command. Many nations do not give NATO commanders more than operational control and, furthermore, burden their contributions with national caveats. Unfortunately, such operational control limits the commander's freedom of action and leads to inefficiencies, such as a duplication of tasks; it may even lead to mistrust on the ground.

We therefore propose that the NATO commander in theatre be given operational command. At the latest, this transfer of authority to the operational commander should be made the moment troops arrive in the theatre of operations. Nations should refrain from imposing caveats and should lift existing national caveats. This would require that, when they take decisions in the NATO Council, nations should agree on the political objectives of the operation and on the concept of operations, plus the associated rules of engagement. Nevertheless, it ought also to be stressed that there are some areas where national control cannot be delegated. The use of nuclear weapons must, of course, remain the prerogative of the nuclear powers.

The appointment of the operational commander and the representation in headquarters of participating nations should reflect national contributions and national preparedness to share the risks and burdens.

In addition, there are certain other areas in which pre-delegation of a response capability will be necessary to protect NATO, where we cannot wait for the NATO Council to decide on a course of action, such as the acute crisis of a missile

attack or cyber attack. This will require the political decision to pre-delegate authority to a military commander to launch defensive measures. To this end, the NATO Council must consider the establishment of suitable NATO Command Forces, and must decide on the degree of pre-delegated authority to use force.

In addition to command and control issues, the administrative side of NATO requires review.

NATO administration

There is little doubt that the costs of the NATO Headquarters, the integrated command structure and subordinate jointly manned and funded agencies need to be funded collectively. But whether there is still a need for a common infrastructure budget is a question that should at least be raised. We could imagine that the infrastructure budget might be replaced by a common procurement budget for assets and capabilities that NATO may wish to fund, and later operate, collectively, as in the case of the badly needed Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. Infrastructure, with the exception of headquarters, would thus become a national responsibility.

New procedures for funding NATO operations are urgently needed. The current cost-sharing system of 'costs lie where they fall' must be abandoned entirely. At present, that means that those who contribute are bearing both the risk of casualties and the financial burden, whereas those who simply talk are rewarded twice. Such a principle can erode NATO's cohesion and it definitely reduces NATO's ability to sustain operations. What is needed is a common cost-sharing formula, to which all allies contribute. We therefore recommend the creation of a commonly financed NATO operations budget. Such a budget could ensure that if NATO agrees

something, then NATO will see it through properly.

Information operations

As NATO is engaged in operations in Afghanistan – operations which, in some places, are of an intensity that NATO forces have not seen before – one of the discrepancies of our time becomes obvious: some of our armed forces are fighting wars, but the societies from which they come live in peace. But as the world is interconnected through almost instantaneous communication, each and every event is immediately flashed up on the TV screens at home, sometimes faster than the chain of command is able to react. In addition, quite often it is the enemy that triggers the information, with the intention of weakening the alliance's cohesion and national support for ongoing operations. To overcome this disquieting state of public relations affairs, NATO must urgently develop an information strategy that will get it and its nations back into the driving seat; otherwise it runs the risk of losing on the home front, even as its forces win at the tactical or operational level.

Therefore NATO must develop an information strategy that can serve three objectives simultaneously:

- It must influence the world's perception that NATO is a force for good.
- Second, it must be on the screens before the opponent starts spreading the news, i.e. NATO has to win and maintain information dominance in public relations.
- Third, it must help to win the hearts and minds both of its own nations (for NATO's just course), and of the people in the theatre of operations.

These proposals in our agenda for immediate change are steps

that need to be taken while NATO is engaged in operations such as those in Afghanistan. They are steps to repair an engine while it is running in high gear, but they are not in themselves sufficient to get NATO ready for the challenges ahead. We therefore propose two additional sets of steps in our agenda for the change of NATO: medium-term steps and long-term steps.

The Medium-Term Agenda for Change

Nobody can seriously dispute the need for NATO to review its 1999 strategic concept. NATO itself acknowledged the necessity of having a new strategic guideline when it accepted, at the 2006 Riga Summit, the Comprehensive Political Guideline (CPG), but this document is no substitute for the still-missing strategic concept.

NATO should take advantage of the new impetus towards mature transatlantic relations, which was noticeable in Germany in the autumn of 2005 and which one can now see in France. With a new British Prime Minister in office and a new US administration taking office on 20 January 2009, now is the right time to draft a new strategic concept. An ambitious option would be to agree it at the 2009 summit, which will mark NATO's 60th anniversary. If this is too ambitious for the NATO bureaucracy to agree at the 2008 summit, then the process of developing a new strategic concept might be set in motion at the 2009 summit, aiming for agreement on the new strategy at the next summit.

We suggest that NATO should develop a grand strategy that encompasses much more than the military domain, and we propose the strategy that we spelt out in Chapter 3 as the initial building block for such a debate.

Simultaneously, NATO should address its biggest shortcoming at this time – its lack of means other than military. As a first step, it should look for an interim remedy, as we live in a world that does not permit us to wait endlessly.

It is our firm belief that the use of military force is by no means the only – or the inevitable – means by which to tackle crises. In very many cases, the use of force is counter-productive to the strategic objectives. We also firmly believe that one can no longer win in an armed conflict simply by killing or capturing as many of the enemy as possible or by just destroying his power base. Non-military means must be part of an integrated strategy: one in which non-military means are coordinated and deployed with maximum precision, concision and integration – the way a military mission should be conducted.

The possibilities here relate greatly to the use of escalation dominance. Recent history is replete with examples of possible escalation by non-military means being squandered because of imprecise objectives and disagreement at the highest level over aims.

Integrated approach

Since NATO does not possess this set of instruments, we propose either exploring the option of a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ agreement with the EU or widening the Canadian initiative of a ‘comprehensive approach’, which is under discussion in NATO as a step to be taken by all NATO nations. The Berlin Plus arrangement between NATO and the EU allowed for NATO military assets and capabilities to be used for EU-led operations, and represents an example of what we consider to be an integrated and allied approach in action.

‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ would be the mirror image, and would see the EU coming to the aid of a NATO-led operation with non-military assets and capabilities, on a case-by-case basis.

Most obviously, the EU could help with police and paramilitary forces, such as the Italian Carabinieri, on request from NATO for NATO-led stabilisation operations; but it could also support NATO with soft-power instruments that the EU has at its disposal.

In addition to such a solution, the non-EU/NATO nations should pledge that they will also make contributions of a similar nature and scope as those NATO nations that are EU members.

As an additional step, we propose a review of the existing set of tools for other than military steps, such as sanctions, the entire tool-kit of ‘defence diplomacy’, etc. This should be done first in NATO, then coordinated with the EU, and thereafter be brought to the attention of the OSCE or the UN.

Obviously, an arrangement such as ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ can be negotiated only if there is an end to the obstructions of NATO–EU cooperation that are currently damaging both organisations. We therefore call on all parties involved to free up the ongoing efforts to achieve a better and more profound EU–NATO cooperation, to negotiate in good faith and without imposing preconditions that render the entire project hostage to narrowly defined national egoisms.

Enlargement and the three circles

As we noted above, and as NATO has declared repeatedly, its doors should always remain open for aspiring nations to apply for full membership. On the other hand, one should not close

one's eyes to the reality that NATO's digestion has not yet fully recovered from the recent rapid process of enlargement. In the course of this, NATO compromised on some of its standards. In some member countries, question marks remain with regard to good governance, and there are also doubts whether the new members have lived up to the commitments they undertook upon accession to NATO. Needless to say, some of them can, as an excuse, point readily to many of the old members, who also failed to set a good example in honouring their commitments. But we feel that NATO should learn its lessons from the experience.

We therefore propose that NATO should state that it will not extend membership invitations to countries in which the standards of NATO members – such as democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance – are not fully adhered to. It should also be agreed that the alliance will not accept any country as a member which has unresolved territorial claims or which is involved in ongoing armed conflicts. The reason for this is the commitment of NATO to defend any country collectively, and to seek future members' contribution to the collective defence of the NATO Treaty Area. In addition, we suggest that NATO should look at future enlargement and partnership arrangements through the lens of its strategic objectives.

As geostrategy is back on the stage, we could imagine NATO developing, as part of its future grand strategy, a concept for enlargement and cooperation that is based on the idea of mutual collective security, and on the following geostrategic concept.

NATO must seek clarity on its geographical dimension. NATO must act where its members' security is at risk. To this end, NATO took a decision at the 2002 Prague Summit to

act wherever necessary. NATO thus became a global alliance, but not a global policeman. In translating the proposed strategy into spheres of action, a concept of three concentric circles emerges. The three circles represent three spheres of alliance and partnership.

The inner circle will always remain the NATO Treaty Area (NTA) that is committed to collective defence, or the Collective Security Area (CSA). The second circle encompasses a wider sphere of partnerships in the Common Security Zone (CSZ). And the third circle of more distant partnerships and allies is the Outer Stability Area (OSA).

These areas are not limited, either geographically or politically. The inner circle of the NATO Treaty Area will change as enlargement progresses, based on NATO's invitation to begin accession talks and on the prospective future member's ability to meet a NATO member's commitments. These three circles are not static, but form a framework, within which we can both categorise NATO's responsibilities, partnerships and activities, and guide the process of enlargement.

When considering NATO enlargement to full membership, the geostrategic sphere must be taken fully into account, as must the capabilities of the current members to defend new members collectively; but so also must the capabilities of new members to defend everyone else collectively. Article 5 is an important two-way street, and we cannot extend membership in a manner that would dilute its meaning and value.

The middle ring, the CSA, concerns the various categories of NATO's external relations. These include the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue to a full-fledged security partnership

in 2004, as well as the NATO–Russia and NATO–Ukraine partnerships. The middle ring or CSA is the area in which the partners seek to achieve collective security through conflict and crisis prevention, and by means of which NATO may keep armed conflicts at a distance from the NATO Treaty Area.

Nonetheless, membership of the CSA partnerships should not be seen as a way of getting cheap membership of NATO. Becoming a member of the middle ring also comes with obligations.

The outer circle, or OSA, is the area in which NATO seeks to promote stability through either permanent or ad hoc cooperation with nations that are neither members nor partners, but that share with the NATO nations certain basic values and convictions and that have similar security interests. This cooperation will seek the permanent exchange of intelligence and ever growing standardisation of formats and procedures, and it may lead, on a case-by-case basis, to coalitions of the willing in interventions, as well as in post-intervention stabilisation operations.

We propose that NATO should consider the option of such a concept, since it would not only enhance security, but would also contribute to strategic stability. It could help to improve the relationship with Russia – which still views NATO encroachment and encirclement as a threat – and could dispel the notion that an ever increasing NATO would become an instrument used to contain China.

Having mentioned Russia and China, one could add India as a country that should also be assured of NATO’s intention of seeking cooperation and partnership and of avoiding conflict and negative competition. NATO must make every effort to

revitalise the NATO–Russia partnership, despite the more confrontational noises that have recently emanated from Moscow. It is worth NATO’s while to consider whether similar agreements could be sought with China and India.

As a last step in our medium-term agenda for change, we propose that a force structure review should be launched, to take stock of where NATO really stands in the process of military transformation and what can be achieved by the time a new strategic concept is applied. It should be a realistic force structure review, which, instead of giving the politicians the usual rose-tinted NATO picture, will deliver the sober analysis they will need as they decide how future scarce resources are to be spent. If this report is ready in time for the 2009 summit, it must not hesitate to pursue a ‘name and shame’ policy as far as the nations’ commitments are concerned.

The Long-Term Agenda for Change

Following agreement on a future NATO grand strategy, NATO will have to embark on a full review of its capabilities of implementing such a strategy.

The easy part will be the review of NATO’s military capabilities. Such a review must be focused on flexibility, deployability and sustainability; but its point of departure must be a solid medium- to long-term political commitment to implement appropriate force structures. To this end, nations should develop such mechanisms as the French ‘loi de programmation’ or the Danish ‘defence contract’, and be supported by an appropriate defence industrial base. The force structure review proposed in our medium-term agenda, which aims to take stock of the transformation process, would serve as the foundation and point of departure.

We propose to use it as a stepping stone to the development of a generic NATO force structure model. If possible, it should be developed in close cooperation with the EU, so that it might be used by the EU as well.

Depending on the results of such a wide-ranging force structure effort, NATO must then consider the extent to which it may wish to establish NATO-owned and operated multinationalally manned and funded component forces, particularly in the enabling forces category – that is, the forces that set up logistics, command and control, communications, reconnaissance and intelligence, that precede the deployment of main body forces and support forces.

We see multinational NATO-owned and operated component forces as key to a quick and affordable modernisation of NATO's forces, but we stress that this approach can only be taken if nations are willing to agree to a firm and binding commitment that these forces will be at NATO's unrestricted disposal for any operations that the NATO Council might authorise.

And it must consider the establishment of disaster relief forces and deployable police or military-police components.

Three models of multinational forces

When it comes to structuring all these multinational forces, there are three basic models available: the AWACS Component Force Model, the Pool Model and the Two Pillar Model.

The Airborne Warning and Control System, or AWACS Component Force model functions well, and this is multinationalally funded and owned.

The Pool Model involves pooling assets of a similar nature and similar purpose under a single arrangement; for example, in bringing together the British Hercules C130 and German A114 cargo aircrafts and amphibious shipping. The Pool Model establishes a common C4 component (command, control, communications, computers) and individual nations make national assets available.

The Two Pillar Model concerns an integrated, multinational-ally manned European component, combined with an American–Canadian command and control (C2) component. This arrangement allows the Americans to maintain their national prerogative, working together without having the Americans and Canadians integrated with European forces. It brings together, under a NATO C4 component, dedicated EU component forces and fully interoperable US and Canadian assets.

We strongly recommend looking into the establishment of a maximum of NATO-owned and operated multinationally manned component forces, in particular in the areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), military police, disaster relief engineers, airborne fire fighters and transportation, including air to air refuelling (AAR).

Depending on the details of a future grand strategy, there may be additional implementation steps, such as the coordination and concentration of foreign and development aid, the common financing of reconstruction efforts, etc.

It may be premature to consider at this time the extent to which this will have to be done within the NATO framework, or whether the strategy will lead to fresh ideas on how to make the common and comprehensive zone of common secu-

riety from Finland to Alaska become a reality. But it should be clear that, even if all the steps we propose for NATO are taken, much would still depend on other organisations acting across the spectrum of action. Moreover, NATO's ability to implement the proposed grand strategy will also depend on implementation of the steps proposed for the UN and the OSCE, and on the degree of NATO–EU cooperation.

European Union

We deliberately refrain from making proposals for EU reform in the same degree of detail as we did for NATO. This is for two reasons: first, a new treaty to replace the doomed 'constitution' has been negotiated and is presently being smuggled in, thus avoiding the risk of having European voters consulted on the matter.

Second, new proposals, such as the French President's idea of establishing a 'group of wise men' and his proposal to create a Mediterranean zone of cooperation, are currently on the table. The outcome of these processes/initiatives will change the EU. We therefore have not established an order of immediate, medium- and long-term steps for the EU. We note, however, that the future role and weight of the EU critically depend on the solution the EU will find for its relationship with Turkey. The stronger the future ties are, the easier it will be for Europe to be an actor that really matters.

Nevertheless, we note the mismatch between the political ambitions of the EU on the one hand, and the political resolve and capabilities to act on the other. We feel that the shortcomings in EU capabilities need to be addressed urgently.

We therefore suggest that the list of immediate action that we suggested for NATO should be considered by the EU as well, modified by the requirements of the status of some EU members as neutral states, and then taken as a guideline for a comprehensive review of EU capabilities and abilities.

In particular, the EU should initiate a force review, in which it identifies the extent to which its member nations have met the requirements set down by the EU in 1999 with its Helsinki Headline Goals and subsequent action plans (though it should be noted that these plans accomplished very little in the way of improving the EU's rather tepid response capabilities).

In this context, the EU should also look at homeland security, which can no longer be treated as a separate domain of internal security: the international market system and the open system of borders in the EU render this impossible, as does the changing nature of the threats, risks and dangers. It will, therefore, become increasingly vital in the coming years to strengthen those international agencies that control borders and customs. Frontex, the EU agency that looks at the control of external borders, customs and border police, is an example of a positive trend, which, we believe, needs to be developed.

For nations to control their borders in the coming years, they may have to overcome the short-term concern of handing over some responsibility for policing those borders to allied and cooperative bodies. In addition, the EU will have to strengthen cooperation and the exchange of information with the US Department of Homeland Security.

Another vital area is coordination between countries in disaster relief. This must be improved. At the most basic level, this means finding out what the different allied countries possess in the way of disaster-relief materials. Thus, in an emergency,

countries would know which allies they need to coordinate with. There is a clear failure to do this at present. For instance, with the threat of bird flu, do any EU countries have even a notion of how many vaccination doses each country has? Could France send the required number of doses to, say, Poland, if it requested them? If so, would Poland know how many doses France had, and so how many it could request? Indeed, does the EU know? A European Homeland Security organisation should be established within the EU. Not a new organisation, but one from within the EU. As with intelligence, the availability of data is crucial in this. A central data bank, which would catalogue individual countries' relief capabilities, would prove its worth at the first disaster. A stand-by forces arrangement already exists in the UN. The EU should similarly arrange a stand-by force to be in place for disaster-relief work.

Having thus hinted at the complexity of government decisions in our time, we wish to express our conviction that the existing form of stove-piped national governments, in which each ministry jealously guards its sphere of influence, is no longer the appropriate answer in the 21st century. We have to leave it to the member nations of both NATO and the EU to draw their own conclusions, but we firmly believe that our vulnerability grows the longer we stick to the traditional format of cabinet responsibilities.

The future we are facing requires more, not less, international integration; but as the national state is – and will remain for the foreseeable future – the core of decision making, we must stress that governments need to think about adapting the organisation of government, as well as about dramatic changes in national decision making.

We also propose that the review process should be under-

taken in close cooperation with NATO, with the aim of avoiding any duplication or inefficient overlaps.

EU–NATO Cooperation

As far as intelligence is concerned, we propose that consideration should be given to the establishment of a Joint NATO/EU Intelligence Fusion Centre, to which both organisations would report their corroborated intelligence findings for the geographical zone that is defined by the area in which EU and NATO zones of interest overlap.

The most important, and indeed most urgent, action on the part of the EU is, however, to end its obstruction of EU–NATO cooperation. The EU nations must understand that, as long as it continues, they are weakening the European capability to take autonomous action. In addition, the nations in NATO must understand that its ability to act according to the necessities of crisis management depends on the EU willingness to support it.

It is our firm belief that the EU should make every effort to become the truly indispensable partner of the US. It could thus maximise its political influence on American decisions. To this end, the EU has, first, to speak with one voice, basing its utterances on a common European Foreign and Security Policy, which must not reduce the national responsibilities of the EU member states but is the result of a process of close consultation and coordination among the EU members, and which will then be applied as a guideline for national policies. Second, its member nations must develop the resolve to act across the whole spectrum of politics, ranging from soft options to the ultimate hard option. Third, the EU must develop and eventually use the capabilities needed across the full

range of the spectrum. In this, the EU should not attempt to copy the Americans, but should assess the shortfalls of the American posture and develop specialised and complementary capabilities. At the same time, these will be of interest to the US, as they will enable the EU to act in coordination with the Americans autonomously, albeit with a limited scope and scale.

| The Roadmap for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership

All the steps discussed so far aim at enhancing the capabilities of the existing organisations, in order to enable the nations in the transatlantic area the better to cope with the challenges, risks and dangers confronting them now and in the foreseeable future. But our long-term vision is for a zone of common security and collective action from Finland to Alaska, where membership of NATO and the EU has de facto created a zone in which partners such as the US, NATO and the EU often have largely identical political interests, even though they occasionally pursue different objectives and have different strategic outlooks, responsibilities and capabilities. They are signatories to quite a few international treaties and agreements that tie them together, but their political coordination and cooperation need to be improved. As we have repeatedly stated, we are convinced that there is no security for Europe without the US, but we also dare to submit that there is no hope for the US to sustain its role as the world's sole superpower without the Europeans as allies.

As such an alliance serves the strategic interests of both sides, the US and the EU, we propose, as a first step towards a new and wider transatlantic bargain, the establishment of a US–

EU–NATO steering directorate at the highest political level, based on existing treaties and agreements, such as the US–EU Agreement, the Washington Treaty and the EU Treaties.

Its immediate task will be the coordination of common responses in crises where common interests are in danger. The point of such a directorate would be to better liaise for the common good, to coordinate who takes the lead on which issue, and to ensure that the three entities support each other. Of course, this could not happen without capabilities. Without capabilities, such institutions are nothing. But in this case, the parties do have capabilities. It is, therefore, our hope that those capabilities can be better harnessed and directed. The US would be persuaded and kept involved by, among other things, its effective double influence in the directorate, with its presence felt not just through the direct US component, but also through its presence as a component of NATO. It is hoped that this ‘double vote’ on such a group would encourage the US to become more involved in the international debate than it has been in recent years.

Obviously, NATO members that are not (or not yet) EU members could take the view that they have only one vote, whereas EU members who are also in NATO have two. To eliminate this irritation, one could decide that NATO will always be the body in which a topic is discussed first, and that those NATO members who are also EU members will undertake not to deviate from their NATO vote when the issues are discussed in EU bodies. Thus, EU deliberations would become discussions of how to implement a decision that NATO has taken and to which the EU will contribute (under a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ or similar arrangement).

The steering directorate would also be able to provide ideas and considerations for other bodies, not least to put things on

the agenda of the G8, for that body to consider further. The steering directorate would likewise be the ideal body to introduce long-term issues into the practical arena.

That is why we propose its establishment as the first step on our roadmap towards a new transatlantic bargain. Should it turn out to be a functioning arrangement, then it will become the body that could – and indeed should – be tasked with developing the necessary instruments for the foundation of a transatlantic forum of cooperation, mutual assistance and security with a hitherto unknown degree of integration, i.e. a new transatlantic charter for peace, security and stability. That is what we mean when we speak of a new transatlantic bargain on collective defence and common security.

But we are convinced that this approach could also help the two mutually indispensable partners, the Europeans and the North Americans, to go step by step towards close cooperation beyond the domains of security and defence – and in time even further. The transatlantic body that will emerge at the end of our roadmap will thus be capable of directing thought towards far wider and longer-term issues than are normally on the table at international discussions. Climate change and other very long-term issues that will impact on all the nations involved could be raised at such a forum, whereas they are unlikely – or less likely – to be raised at the institutional level. It is, therefore, hoped that we could move forward, step by step, towards more, wider and better transatlantic cooperation.

Concluding Message

Concluding message: Helping to restore certainty

What we propose in our agenda for change is not intended to be prescriptive. Nor do we pretend to have covered all the issues that need to be considered. But we do believe that we are proposing an agenda that is feasible and affordable, and that could strengthen and deepen the cooperation between the two truly mutually indispensable partners, North America and Europe. It is an agenda rooted in the firm conviction that none of our nations is any longer capable of dealing with the complex and challenging world in which we live on its own, and that all of our nations have but one chance: We must stand shoulder to shoulder; we must share the risks and the burdens; and we must show the common resolve to see our commitments through and to prevail.

It is an agenda which, when implemented, will make it easier to provide security for the citizens of all nations between Finland and Alaska, while helping to prevent war and armed conflict elsewhere – or at least to contain and end it as quickly as possible. We could thus create the breathing space our nations will need to cope



with the tremendous challenges the next decades will bring. We might, in the medium to long term, thus be capable of restoring certainty – something which we see as the most important prerequisite for functioning societies. Certainty is not all we need; but without it there will be nothing.

About the authors

The authors, General Dr Klaus Naumann (former Chief of the Defence Staff of Germany and former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO), Field Marshal The Lord Inge (former Chief of the Defence Staff of the United Kingdom), General John Shalikashvili (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America, Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe), Admiral Jacques Lanxade (former Chief of the Defence Staff of France and former Ambassador to Tunisia) and General Henk van den Breemen (former Chief of the Defence Staff of the Netherlands) have all served together in NATO.

Most of them were together on 11 September 2001 at a meeting in the Netherlands. Then the idea was born to write a book on future security. The idea was shelved for a while and evolved into the desire to write a pamphlet, with the focus on a vision for the transatlantic alliance, which they regard as indispensable.

To assist in the writing process, the authors were joined by Benjamin Bilski, who lectures in philosophy at the Faculty of Law of the University of Leiden in the Netherlands; and by Douglas Murray, an author and Director of the Centre for Social Cohesion in Westminster.

In the course of the past year the authors have had 12 meetings in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where ideas were exchanged as the drafts took shape. These meetings were chaired by General van den Breemen.

Various published and unpublished writings, as well as professional expertise, form the sources to this document. Where

the sources of the material have been speeches, writings or policy documents by the principal authors, these are not referenced. Other important published sources of basic facts and statistics are referenced in the text. In addition, the publications by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, especially *The Military Balance and Strategic Survey* series, have been invaluable sources for basic data and background.

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